

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

FEBRUARY, 1974

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1974

NON-CIRCULATING

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Current History

FEBRUARY, 1974

VOL. 66, NO. 390

In this issue, eight articles evaluate the Middle East situation today and the policies of the nations in the area. As our first article points out: "The . . . role assumed by the United States in the effort to achieve a settlement, the growing energy crisis . . . and the increased dependence of Israel on the United States [have] combined to stress the importance of the United States relationship with Israel and suggested that this would be the major focus of Israeli foreign policy during the postwar period."

Israel Between War and Peace

BY BERNARD REICH

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THE AMERICAN-INITIATED Middle East cease-fire of August, 1970, was shattered by a coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel on October 6, 1973—Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. The Yom Kippur War (as it has been popularly labeled) also ended the efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement associated with the June war of 1967 and the more recent efforts at a settlement set in motion by United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The 1973 conflict and its immediate aftermath had a significant impact on Israel, the Arab world, and the international community and generated a fresh series of efforts to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The impact of the war on Israel was significant. In purely tangible terms it had perhaps the most far-reaching effect of any of the other conflicts to date. Manpower losses for the period October 6 to October 24 were announced as 1,854 killed in battle,¹ but this figure rose as severely wounded soldiers died and as those who were killed in the cease-fire period were added to the totals. The number of wounded was about double this. The total of about 5,000 casualties was high for a country with a total population just over 3,000,000.

The mobilization of the largest part of the civilian reserve army of several hundred thousand caused dis-

locations in agriculture and industrial production despite the large number of volunteers, from within Israel and other countries, who replaced the mobilized reserves. Tourism and diamond sales, which are major and important sources of foreign currency, fell during the war. The port of Elath, at the southern tip of Israel on the Gulf of Aqaba and a major oil terminus, was cut off by an Arab blockade at the Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa at the entrance to the Red Sea, thus affecting the flow to Israel of oil from Iran and trade with East Africa and Asia. The material losses were large and included important and expensive elements of Israel's air force and armor (most notably Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft and tanks). The mobilization of civilian trucks severely affected the transportation sector and this, in turn, further hampered the recovery of the economy.

The cost of the war—including tanks, planes, guns, fuel, and ammunition—was estimated to exceed \$5 billion, higher than the annual state budget. Military expenditure, lost production, and damage to civilian and military installations on the Golan Heights were part of the cost. Some of the costs would be made up by funds transferred from other parts of the state budget and the social welfare services would in turn receive financial aid from foreign sources, such as contributions to the United Jewish Appeal (UJA)

¹ *The New York Times*, November 7, 1973.

and sales of Israeli bonds. Israel hoped to secure nearly \$2 billion through the UJA and bonds sales in the 15-month period between the October war and the end of 1974 (about three times what would normally be expected).² These funds would permit the financing of social and development activities when local means which would have been used for these ends are diverted to defense needs. Without these external funds Israel would be unable to finance the war and maintain the development effort, despite a compulsory war loan and substantial Israeli subscription to a voluntary war loan.

There was a further disruption of national life occasioned by such factors as the inability of the universities to open as scheduled for the 1973-1974 academic year and the maintenance of a high state of alert and mobilization due to the uncertainty of the cease-fire and the subsequent talks with Egypt. With the retention of a substantial number of men under arms there were dislocations in the various sectors of national life. There was little question but that economic austerity would follow the 1973 war just as the 1967 war was followed by an economic boom and prosperity.

INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION

Israel's position in the international community deteriorated with the outbreak of fighting. Although the war was not initiated by Israel, she came in for both condemnation and the rupture of diplomatic relations.

Prior to the war Israel's international position had been declining. The propaganda war had been turning to the favor of the Arabs and Israel had been losing world sympathy. This could be traced in most instances to Israel's continued refusal to withdraw from occupied Arab territories and her responses to Arab terrorism, which increasingly came under international condemnation. Since the break in relations with Uganda in the spring of 1972, several states in Africa severed relations and in September, 1973, Cuba took a similar action. Immediately prior to the outbreak of the war, Israel had come into sharp dispute with Austria over the refusal of Austria to continue to provide facilities for Russian emigrants on their way to Israel—a matter on which the Austrians had refused to relent. There was increasing international sentiment, and resolutions of various international and regional organizations calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.

² Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir to the Knesset on November 14, 1973 in *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, November 20, 1973, p. 7.

³ For a more detailed exposition of Israel's relations with Africa, see Bernard Reich, "Israel's Policy in Africa," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 18, pp. 14-26 (Winter, 1964).

⁴ *The New York Times*, November 26, 1973. For an Israeli assessment and explanation of the ruptures, see David Landau, "Africa's Policy Had to Happen," *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, November 27, 1973, p. 12.

During the course of the war and immediately afterward, Israel's ties with most of the states of black Africa were broken. Many of them linked the rupture of relations with Israel's refusal to withdraw from territories occupied in the June war. Except for South Africa no major African state publicly backed Israel or offered assistance. To most Israelis this not only symbolized the injustice of the international community but also the success of Arab oil blackmail and the failure of Israel's program of international cooperation. Israel had provided many of these African states with technical assistance which they had lauded publicly for its constructiveness in promoting African development.³

Some of the breaks were more difficult to accept than others and had a greater impact. On October 23, Ethiopia severed diplomatic relations in a declaration by Emperor Haile Selassie in which he said that relations would remain severed until Israel withdrew from territories occupied in the 1967 war. Because of Ethiopia's strategic location, her importance as a leader in Africa, and the depth and nature of her ties with Israel, this came as a shock and a disappointment. Ghana broke relations on October 28. She was among the first countries in the third world to benefit from Israeli assistance which began shortly after Ghana's independence in 1957. Finally, on November 8, the Ivory Coast announced that she had broken relations with Israel, thus leaving Israel with relations with only five African states: South Africa and four black states—Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Of these, only South Africa (shunned by much of the rest of the continent) was a major and important state. Then, later in November, 1973, the Organization of African Unity Ministerial Council noted the "expansionist designs of belligerent Israel" and denounced her.⁴

The ruptures with Africa were a disappointment but a shift in the attitudes and policies of the European states was perhaps more significant. Israel's international isolation was compounded by the unwillingness of the European allies of the United States to allow the use of their facilities and/or airspace for the shipment and transfer of supplies to Israel during the war. This forced the United States to establish special systems for the resupply of Israel. Bases and airspace were generally denied to the United States. Portugal was an exception and allowed the use of the Azores. The Europeans were reluctant to be associated with the United States effort and were concerned about the reduction of Arab oil shipments to them. On November 6, the nine members of the European Economic Community adopted a joint communiqué on the Middle East clearly aimed at placating the Arabs. It called on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories and recognize the rights of the Palestinians.

Japan, which receives from 80 to 90 percent of her oil from the Middle East and much of that from the Arab states, also began to modify her policy. The Japanese, who had hitherto adopted and maintained a posture of neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, now seemed to shift to a more pronounced pro-Arab position. They called for implementation of United Nations Resolution 242 (1967) and stressed the Arab interpretation of the resolution, calling on Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories.⁵ They also increased their contributions to the United Nations for aid to Palestinian refugees and offered development loans to several Arab states.⁶

The war also increased Israeli dependence on the United States. No other country could or was prepared to provide Israel with the vast quantities of modern and sophisticated arms required for war or for the political and moral support necessary to negotiate peace.

During the war the United States resupplied Israel with a substantial amount of military equipment, including "conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance . . . tanks, aircraft, radios, and other military equipment which have been lost in action."⁷ Many members of Congress went on record in support of the Israeli position and of the United States resupply effort. On October 19, President Richard Nixon asked Congress to authorize \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance for Israel in order "to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union."⁸ The United States also alerted its armed forces when there was an indication that the Soviet Union might become involved militarily in the area. The United States reacted to the Arab embargo on oil shipments by stressing that it would seek to become independent of Arab oil and that United States energy requirements would not lead to a shift in its policies in the Middle East.⁹ Despite these reassuring signs there was concern in Israel that the United States might shift away from its support of Israel and that it might utilize its leverage to affect changes in Israel's position.

There were questions about the United States role on such matters as the cease-fire, the peace negotia-

tions, and the terms of a Middle East settlement. Apparently there were American pressures on Israel to accept the initial cease-fire and to permit a relief convoy to resupply the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Some Israelis were concerned about an apparent United States courting of the Arabs including the courteous treatment accorded Ismail Fahmy, the special Egyptian envoy, during his visit to Washington, the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt, and the visits by Secretary of State Kissinger to Arab capitals (Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, Amman, and Riyadh) on his way to China in November. Some elements in Israel expressed concern that Israel might be sacrificed by the United States in an effort to further détente and in this regard due note was made of the oil factor and its direct and indirect potential impact on the United States and its relationship with Israel. The Israeli concern was demonstrated in part by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's visit to Washington where she met with the President and the Secretary of State. After meeting with President Richard Nixon, Mrs. Meir said that she was reassured of continued United States support for Israel's security and well-being. She also denied that the United States had pressured Israel with regard to the cease-fire and subsequent events in the Middle East. She noted:

We have a common goal, the U.S. and Israel: first, for the preservation of the cease-fire and, two, to work toward the advancement of a true and lasting peace in the area. . . . I am confident that the friendly relations between our two countries, which manifested themselves so often in the past and lately, that these relationships will be enhanced and grow. The President has assured me that the security and well-being of Israel are a major concern to the U.S.¹⁰

The important role assumed by the United States in the effort to achieve a settlement, the growing energy crisis in the United States and worldwide, and the increased dependence of Israel on the United States combined to stress the importance of the United States relationship with Israel and suggested that this would be the major focus of Israeli foreign policy during the postwar period.

THE WARS OF THE JEWS

The cease-fire of October 22, 1973, was followed by what Israelis often refer to as the "wars of the Jews"—internal political conflicts and disagreements. The initial impact of the war on Israeli politics was to bring about the postponement of the elections, originally scheduled for October 30, to December 31, and the suspension of political campaigning and electioneering for the duration of the conflict.

The war interrupted the campaign for the Knesset

⁵ *The New York Times*, November 22, 1973; and *The New York Times*, November 9, 1973.

⁶ *The New York Times*, December 1, 1973.

⁷ President Nixon in a message to the Congress on October 19, 1973 contained in a White House press release of the same date.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ See Secretary Kissinger's comments in his press conference on November 21, 1973.

¹⁰ Transcript of press conference, Washington, D.C., November 1, 1973.

(Parliament) elections and provided new issues for the opposition to raise—the conduct of the war and the “mistakes” which preceded it. Prior to the war a right-wing opposition bloc, Likud (Union), composed of several parties and groups including Gahal, Free Center, State List, and the Land of Israel Movement, was formed. The basic campaign theme was its “time for a change.” Although the movement seemed to falter prior to the war, the conflict allowed its resurgence. General Ariel “Arik” Sharon, who had retired from the army and had been a major force in the consolidation of Likud, was mobilized in the war and emerged as a popular hero for leading Israeli forces to the west bank of the canal. Menahem Begin, the leader of Gahal, criticized the government for accepting the cease-fire, saying it was detrimental to national security and would invite rather than prevent further Arab aggression. He also criticized the failure of the government to meet the Egyptian-Syrian threat at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War¹¹ and called on Prime Minister Meir to resign.¹² General Sharon was critical of the Israeli high command for delay in crossing the canal and subsequently in reinforcing his troops and their advanced positions on the west bank of the canal—delay which he felt cost Israel some important military accomplishments. He was also critical of the military posture which allowed the initial Egyptian crossing of the canal.¹³

INTERNAL DISSENSION

Within the government there were also voices of dissatisfaction. Justice Minister Yaacov Shimshon Shapir called for the resignation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and, when he failed to receive the backing of the party and the Cabinet, resigned from the government. There were challenges within the Labor party to Prime Minister Meir and more especially to two of her closest advisers—Israel Galili and Moshe Dayan—on the questions of defense, security, and the occupied territories. There were demands that the elections be postponed, that the party revise its platform, and that the election lists be reopened for the addition of new candidates. There were clear indications in the weeks following the war that Labor had lost an element of popular support and that this would be reflected in the polls. Partly to quiet internal political complaints the Cabinet decided on November 18, 1973, to establish a commission of in-

quiry to investigate the events leading up to the war (including information concerning the enemy's moves and intentions), the assessments and decisions of military and civilian bodies in regard to this information, and the Israeli Defense Forces deployment and preparedness for battle and its actions in the first phase of the fighting. The commission of inquiry consisted of the President of the Supreme Court, Justice Shimon Agranat; the State Comptroller, Yitzhak Nebenzahl; Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau; and two former Chiefs of Staff, Yigal Yadin and Haim Laskov. All were widely respected public personalities who enjoyed public confidence.

PEACE, SECURITY AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Israel's Defense Forces were able to achieve remarkable gains in the Yom Kippur War despite the Arabs' decided advantages, including the element of surprise. The Arabs inflicted early and heavy losses on Israel and they had a relatively easy penetration of the fortifications along the Suez Canal (the Bar-Lev Line) and in the Golan Heights. They also had a clear quantitative superiority in manpower and in equipment. Despite these Arab advantages the Israelis inflicted substantial losses on the enemy and advanced into Egyptian and Syrian territory, although the Egyptians still held much of the eastern bank of the canal when the cease-fire came into effect. The war reconfirmed the Israelis' faith in their defense forces although questions were raised about the conduct of the war and the state of readiness at the outbreak of conflict, as well as the estimates of Israeli military intelligence.

The October war highlighted the question of Israeli security¹⁴ and reinforced the view that Israel must have secure frontiers. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, noted that if Israel “had gone back to the previous armistice lines . . . then the attacks of 6 October . . . would have done such destruction to our vital security that perhaps Israel and all its people . . . might now all be lost—lost, swept away in a fearful massacre.”¹⁵ The war brought home to Israel a significant realization of the value of those territories as a buffer zone

(Continued on page 84)

¹¹ *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, October 30, 1973.

¹² *Ibid.*, November 20, 1973, p. 5.

¹³ See his comments in *The New York Times*, November 9 and 12, 1973; *Washington Post*, November 11, 1973.

¹⁴ On the centrality of security considerations in Israeli thinking see Bernard Reich, “Israel's Quest for Security,” *Current History*, vol. 62, pp. 1–5, 48, 52 (January, 1972).

¹⁵ Statement by Abba Eban, to United Nations General Assembly, October 8, 1973. See also the statement by Golda Meir to the Knesset on October 16, 1973 and also her press conference on October 13, 1973.

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"... Sadat enhanced his prestige within Egypt and the entire Arab world. By destroying the twin myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab ineptness, he has given the Arabs a new sense of self-respect, dignity, and prestige."

Egypt's Foreign Policy

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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THERE HAVE BEEN TWO significant developments in the Middle East during the past year: first, Egypt's decision to go to war to break the Arab-Israeli stalemate that had existed since the June, 1967, war; second, the Arab cooperation in using oil as a political lever against the West (and Japan), in order to pressure the United States into limiting its support of Israel. By opting for war, Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat threw a monkey wrench into the fragile network of evolving Soviet-American relations: he forced the superpowers to look for a solution of the Middle East problem, lest renewed hostilities jeopardize their developing détente elsewhere.

The situation in the area is still precarious: the United Nations-sponsored cease-fire, imposed to halt the three and one-half week war, is holding (late December), but the possibility of another round of fighting is always present; the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in intensive diplomatic discussions, but they have yet to agree on a plan that they are prepared to impose on the regional contestants; the Arab oil slowdown/boycott has created economic difficulties in West Europe, Japan, and the United States, and the situation could get worse, if the Arab oil-producers cut back even further; Egypt has declared her readiness to participate in a peace conference, but Syria and the Palestinians are dragging their feet, although they will probably follow Egypt's lead; Egypt and Syria contend that the only basis for a settlement is Israel's withdrawal to the June 5, 1967, borders and an agreement satisfactory to the Palestinians—neither of which condition is acceptable to Israel—so the possibility of a prompt settlement seems remote.

Until the policies of the interested parties emerge more clearly from the round robin of informal and formal discussions being undertaken within the United Nations framework and on a bilateral basis, the implications of the latest Arab-Israeli war for the Middle East and world politics will remain a subject of spec-

ulation. A review of the key elements of Egypt's diplomatic and military strategy, as they appear in the perspective of the past year, may provide a basis for evaluating Egypt's position in the new Middle East situation that has developed since October 6, 1973.

THE FOURTH ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

On October 6, 1973, Egyptian forces launched an assault across the Suez Canal and established footholds on the eastern bank. (At the same time, the Syrian army struck in the Golan Heights and penetrated almost to the June 5, 1967, border with Israel, before retreating in fierce fighting. Since this article focuses on Egypt, no attention will be given to Syria, but the events on the Syrian front must be kept in mind when evaluating the overall situation.)

That the Egyptians and Syrians started the war is clear from the reports of United Nations observers posted along the Suez Canal, from independent Western sources, and from the initial advantage that accrued to the attacking Egyptians. The timing of the attack, coming as it did on the Jewish Holy Day, Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement and the most sacred day on the Hebrew calendar, suggests that Egypt (and Syria) calculated their move to catch Israeli forces at a minimum level of preparedness.

The tactical surprise enabled Egyptian forces to overrun Israeli's first line of defense in Sinai, the Bar-Lev Line, and to control the eastern side of the Suez Canal for the first time since June 10, 1967. The Egyptian attack was well executed. It pushed across the canal at five points, using pontoon bridges, which had been assembled and moved into position without alerting the Israelis, and which were kept operational, notwithstanding heavy Israeli air and artillery fire. The Egyptians used their sophisticated Soviet weapons with great effectiveness in the early stages of the battle. Particularly deadly were the SAM-6's, mobile missiles, which accounted for heavy Israeli air losses. The tank battles that raged in Sinai were the greatest since

World War II, and they engaged more tanks and armored vehicles than the Battle of Stalingrad.

Efforts by the United States to obtain support in the United Nations Security Council for an immediate cease-fire repeatedly failed because of Soviet opposition and Arab lack of interest: as long as there was a possibility of a major victory, Egypt was unwilling to stop the fighting, believing that the important objective was to wear Israel down and force her to agree to Arab terms.

For its part, the Soviet Union resupplied Egypt and Syria with weapons and ammunition. Its massive resupply effort, which threatened to tilt the outcome of the fighting decisively against Israel, prompted a comparable American response. Within a week after the Egyptians had triggered the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the nascent superpower détente was in danger of being squashed and a Cuban-type confrontation was looming. On October 15, 1973, the Soviet leadership declared, in a joint communiqué issued at the end of a one-day visit by Algeria's President Houari Boumedienne, that the U.S.S.R. was determined "to assist in every way the liberation of Arab territories occupied by Israel." However, as the mobilization of the Israeli army began to make itself felt on the battlefield and the likelihood of a clear-cut Arab military victory decreased, the Soviet government began to show interest in arranging a cease-fire. It was also concerned over its collision course with the United States.

On October 17, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin flew to Cairo for secret discussions with President Sadat: presumably, he urged the Egyptians to settle temporarily for their military achievements and their success in disproving the myth of Israeli invincibility, and to turn to diplomacy to attain their political aims. No doubt Moscow was as concerned over the slowly shifting situation on the battlefield (where Israel was gaining the upper hand) as over the ominous turn in Soviet-American relations. On October 20, at the Kremlin's urgent request, United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger went to Moscow. Two days later, the Soviet and American governments called for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council and cosponsored a resolution calling for an end to hostilities. Fighting continued for several days, as each side jockeyed for position before the cease-fire finally went into effect on October 25, 1973.

The big questions are whether the latest cease-fire will lead to serious political negotiations between Egypt and Israel; whether Sadat will cling to his demand that Israel agree in advance to withdraw from all Arab territory captured in the June war before talks on a final settlement begin or whether he will agree to talks without such rigid preconditions; and what the role of the superpowers will be.

The knotty prisoner-of-war exchange issue was unraveled, with formal exchanges between Cairo and

Tel Aviv starting on November 15; at the same time, arrangements were made for supplying the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army and the city of Suez, which were both surrounded by Israeli forces: in this, the United Nations forces played a key role. The start of serious political negotiations between Egypt and Israel seems within reach, but the danger of further hostilities is ever present.

WHY WAR?

There are a number of possible explanations, none mutually exclusive, for Sadat's decision to go to war. First, he was fulfilling a vow he had made more than two years before, but which for various reasons he had been unable to carry out. Since proclaiming "the year of decision" in 1971, Sadat was forced to postpone war with Israel, to the frequent derision of his critics, in December, 1971, at the time of the Indo-Pakistani war, and again in the summer of 1972, when he summarily expelled some 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet military advisers and personnel. Sadat was determined not to allow the stalemate to become permanent, not to permit Israel indefinitely to retain the territories captured in the June war.

As a result of his action, Sadat enhanced his prestige within Egypt and the entire Arab world. By destroying the twin myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab ineptness, he has given the Arabs a new sense of self-respect, dignity, and prestige. For the first time in 25 years, Egyptians showed that they could defeat the Israelis if they were properly led and equipped. That the early victories proved short-lived and limited in character is not crucial for Sadat; that there were victories is crucial.

Second, Sadat may have sought to establish Egyptian control over the east bank of the Suez Canal; to consolidate the beachhead, thus making the point to Israel that she could not hope to keep all Arab territory indefinitely; and to rely on a U.N. cease-fire to assure the preservation of his initial gains. This interpretation assumes that Egypt did not anticipate or expect an all-out victory over Israel. If so, one is perplexed by Egypt's refusal to agree to a cease-fire during the first week of fighting, when Egypt still had control over the entire east bank. Were Sadat and the Soviet Union overconfident? Did Sadat overestimate Egypt's capability to achieve a greater breakthrough and recapture more of Sinai? Was he aiming for a full victory? If so, there was a miscalculation whose cost is not yet clear.

Third, Sadat did not want the United States and the Soviet Union to proceed with their efforts at détente, tacitly agreeing to freeze the status quo in the Middle East. While continuation of a condition of "no war, no peace" was acceptable to the superpowers, it was anathema to Sadat. As far as he was concerned, the summits in Moscow and Washington (in

May, 1972, and June, 1973, respectively) were Yalta-type sellouts of the Arab cause. By precipitating a new war, Sadat forced the superpowers to grapple with the Arab-Israeli problem to an extent hitherto unknown. Both Washington and Moscow have been notified that their relationship cannot readily or soon be improved unless there is some resolution of the Middle East crisis satisfactory to Egypt.

Sadat's initiative suggests he calculated that regardless of the final military outcome, he could not lose politically. He could, of course, have overestimated the military power of Egypt and Syria and underestimated Israel's recuperative capability; however, he was probably very confident that the Soviet Union would not, indeed could not, permit another Arab defeat, lest the entire Soviet presence in the Arab world be undermined. So Sadat held strong cards, if he had reason to believe that the Soviet Union would bail him out in the event that the military situation turned unfavorable to the Arabs. Meanwhile, he succeeded in drawing the superpowers into the vortex of the Middle East maelstrom, twisting their *détente* so that it was difficult to see much future for it.

Finally, by going to war, Sadat strengthened his position as the leading spokesman for the Arab world. In the months before October 6, 1973, he had skillfully woven an impressive diplomatic design: the strengthening of ties with conservative, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms; reconciliation with Jordan; improved relations with the Palestinian guerrilla organizations; effective parrying of mercurial Libyan President Muammar el-Qaddafi's demands for immediate merger with Egypt; improved relations with West Europe (to Israel's detriment, as time was to show); exploitation of the Nonaligned Conference, held in September, 1973; and encouragement to American investors to construct a \$350-million oil pipeline between the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Suez. Sadat succeeded in these far-ranging diplomatic activities, and succeeded, moreover, at a time when the Egyptian economy was experiencing serious difficulties. He has generated more support within the Arab world for Egypt's strategy of coping with Israel than Nasser ever did. Sadat has pursued, and promoted, tangible national interests, albeit within the supposedly broader framework of Arab unity. As a result, his relations with all Arab countries except Libya have improved.

UNITY, YES; MERGER, NO

In the summer of 1972, Egyptian President Sadat and Libyan President Muammar el-Qaddafi pledged the merger of their respective countries on September 1, 1973. In April, 1973, Qaddafi proclaimed a "cultural revolution," intended "to turn the government over to the popular masses" and institutionalize Islamic fundamentalism by replacing secular laws and stand-

ards with religious ones. "People's Committees," approved by Qaddafi's military council, blanketed the country, increasingly interfering in all facets of everyday personal and professional activities.

The more radical Qaddafi became, the less interested in the merger was Egypt. Though Qaddafi's militancy and religious revivalism had appeal for the Ulema (Muslim religious leaders), members of the ultra-conservative Muslim Brotherhood, and small segments of the university students, it was viewed with alarm by most of Egypt's elite. The military, the middle class, and the bureaucracy, the key groups upon whom Sadat's power rests, were suspicious of Qaddafi's fanatical fervor: their own style is accommodation and manipulation, not social revolution and moral evangelism.

During a visit to Cairo in late June, 1973, Qaddafi challenged Sadat to undertake a "cultural revolution" similar to the one he had started in Libya. He called for a return to Islamic precepts and an end to secularism and hedonism, an all-out effort to liberate "Palestine," and an immediate merger of the two countries. He made little headway in the attempt to carry his appeal over Sadat's head to the representatives of key elites. A sharp rebuff came at a meeting of Egypt's "women's lib" movement, where he contended that women's place was at home because certain "biological defects" limit her professionally. The women present angrily drowned him out, asserting "these are not defects, Mr. President." In late July, Qaddafi sent several thousand Libyans into Egypt by car, with signs demanding merger. However, Sadat was not to be stampeded into any premature political union. He sensed a lack of enthusiasm in Egypt, and a potential danger in giving a political foothold to Qaddafi, whose ambition and oil wealth made his recklessness dangerous. Furthermore, the reputation of Libyans in Egypt contrasts vividly with Qaddafi's puritanical way of life and is based on the thousands of free-wheeling Libyans who flood into Cairo and Alexandria during the summer months, driving flashy cars and spending wildly on hotels, gambling and night clubs.

In late August, Sadat visited Saudi Arabia, apparently to obtain assurance of financial and political support from the oil-rich kingdom. Sadat knew that Saudi Arabia had serious misgivings about Qaddafi and the proposed merger between Egypt and Libya. In effect, Sadat was faced with a choice between Libya and Saudi Arabia, and he chose the latter. Once securing an alliance with King Faisal, Sadat disengaged from Qaddafi, persuading the volatile Libyan that any merger should be approached slowly and over a long period of time. Sadat found the conservatism of Faisal more congenial than the radicalism of Qaddafi. (With Faisal a prime backer of Egypt financially, Saudi Arabia may be expected to have a major

voice in any Arab proposal for the future of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.)

Sadat also visited Damascus in late August, when he and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad may have completed their plan for the attack against Israel. When the fighting started, Qaddafi expressed disapproval, allegedly on the ground that Sadat was not pushing for the total elimination of the state of Israel, but also possibly because he had not been informed of the plan to resume hostilities.

NONALIGNMENT

In his broad-gauged design for diplomatic support, Sadat has used the nonaligned movement to generate anxiety abroad over the precariousness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to effectuate the international isolation of Israel. No line has been overlooked in stringing the Egyptian bow.

The fourth Conference of Nonaligned States convened in Algeria in early September, 1973, largely at the behest of the African countries. The decision to hold the conference was made at the meeting of foreign ministers at Georgetown (Guyana) in August, 1972. For the African governments, racial issues loomed large: discrimination in South Africa, and colonialism in countries such as Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia were the gut issues.

The Arab governments, led by Egypt, lent ideological support but had little else to offer, being absorbed in the campaign against Israel. Not all of them, notably Libya and Saudi Arabia, considered the Nonaligned Conference as of any immediate use. However, among Arab delegations, Egypt's position predominated; namely, her view that the resolutions of the Nonaligned Conference served two functions: first, they persuaded the Arab people that the overwhelming number of countries in the world are behind them and against Israel; and second, by repeatedly emphasizing political and moral imperatives, they could be translated eventually into diplomatic support.

Sadat's lobbying for African support of the Arab position on the Arab-Israeli dispute has paid off. Whereas only nine African states severed their diplomatic ties to Israel prior to October 6, 1973, since the latest war, 18 African nations have joined in the diplomatic ostracization of Israel. By assiduously courting the key African countries—in May, 1973, for example, Sadat attended the tenth anniversary conference of the Organization of African Unity and appealed for support—Egypt appears to have wiped out the gains of 20 years of Israeli technical assistance and foreign aid. In the past few months, in contrast to the period after the June, 1967, war, Egypt has succeeded in garnering African support for a policy of isolating Israel. At the United Nations, Sadat can rely on the unquestioning adherence of more than 60 nonaligned

countries. These could prove useful in undermining the international position of Israel.

OIL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON

As the fighting in the Middle East escalated and the United States undertook to resupply Israel with arms and aircraft to offset massive Soviet supplies to Egypt and Syria, the oil-producing Arab countries introduced a weapon they had been threatening to use for several years: a cutback and/or embargo on shipments of oil to the United States and other countries helping Israel. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Algeria and others announced curtailment of oil shipments, including an embargo on shipments to the United States and the Netherlands, and a slowdown to West Europe and Japan. This has exacerbated the energy problem for the United States and its allies.

Sadat, through the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, skillfully organized the disposition of Arab oil for political purposes. By his reconciliation with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, and by careful coordination of Arab oil and diplomacy, Sadat has impressed upon the United States the need for pressuring Israel into a settlement, lest Western economies begin to suffer seriously from the slowdown of oil deliveries. To Sadat (and King Faisal) must go the credit for forging the Arab oil weapon. So far the strategy has worked: on the one hand, it has enabled the oil-producing Arab countries to raise prices significantly, thus bringing vast new revenue into Arab coffers; on the other hand, by progressively cutting oil production to West Europe, Japan, and the United States, the Arab countries have found a way of pressing the United States to adopt a policy more favorable to the Arabs. One month after the imposition of a United Nations cease-fire, the oil weapon was showing results.

Although Sadat's decision to attack Israeli forces in Sinai did not produce any decisive military victory, it does appear to have borne fruit politically. By his action, Sadat broke the Middle East stalemate, and gained both new flexibility and friends, which hold out the promise of retrieving, in the foreseeable future, most of the losses of June, 1967.

On October 22, 1973, the U.N. Security Council finally imposed a cease-fire, as the United States and the Soviet Union acted jointly to dampen the bitter
(Continued on page 88)

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"Libya's financial strength rested, of course, on her oil revenues which permitted her to accumulate a sizable surplus estimated by mid-1973 at \$3 billion. With estimated reserves of 25 billion barrels, Libya's position and oil policy differed in several respects from the policies of other oil-rich states. . . ."

Popular Revolution in Libya

BY GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

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IN 1973, LIBYA's political scene was dominated by three issues, all interrelated: the popular revolution, oil, and union with Egypt.

On April 15, 1973, the 1402d anniversary of Prophet Mohammed's birth, speaking at a rally in Zwara, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), proclaimed a new "popular revolution" based on five points:

1. Suspending all laws currently enforced because of their reactionary character; henceforth the state will be guided by Islamic legislation.

2. Purging the country of all people who are politically "sick." This will apply to those who preach communism and capitalism as well as to Muslim Brethren if they engage in clandestine activities.

3. Distributing arms to "the toiling masses of the people." "Anybody who stands against the revolution . . . will not be given arms. The arms will be pointed at his chest. Thus the entire people will be converted to a people's resistance."

4. Launching an administrative revolution. "Those . . . who have formed a barrier between the revolution and the masses . . . this bourgeois class, the bureaucrats . . . require an administrative revolution on the part of the people whom I will arm. The masses must destroy bureaucracy and destroy barriers. . . . If the interests of the people are going to be lost for the sake of the Government, down with the Government and long live the people."

5. Starting a cultural revolution. "The September 1 Revolution is inspired by Islam. . . . We therefore adhere to the Holy Book [Koran]. . . . We must begin a cultural battle, a battle in which I will have to tear down and burn all misleading books, the imported books that make the young people lose their heads and become lost. I will wage a revolution against the

libraries and universities and educational curricula and against everything written."

Qaddafi concluded his speech by stressing that the Libyans will be the first people in the world to implement a unique revolution in which the armed masses will assume the responsibility of ruling; that those who oppose Arab unity and socialism will be "trampled"; that Libya with her power of faith will challenge the material force of the United States; and that the Libyan people will "lead the Arab nation to dignity and unity."¹

By the time of the announcement in Zwara, Libya's revolution, which toppled the monarchy on September 1, 1969, was over three years old. To Colonel Qaddafi, however, "the past three years were not part of our true revolution"; they were rather an "introduction to the veritable revolution in which the masses take over power in order to govern themselves by themselves."

In launching his popular revolution, Qaddafi was motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations. His ideology reflected his personal background and his ideals and ambitions. Born in a tent as a son of a tribesman, Qaddafi was brought up in the environment of simple Islamic fundamentalism, distrustful of alien ideas and modes of life. As a young officer, he absorbed the nationalist Pan-Arab ideas emanating from Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser. And as a member of the nonprivileged social stratum, he viewed with suspicion and resentment the native wealthy classes. Added to this was the continuous frustration experienced by the Arabs over the successive humiliations suffered in any military showdown with Israel. Arabs yearned for a radical solution which would do away with the past defeats and degradations and which would open a new era of strength, dignity, and justice for the common man: Qaddafi's education was conditioned by his local environment; his exposure to the great books and thought

¹ Text in *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, Tripoli, April 16, 1973. Subsequently referred to as the Zwara speech.

processes of the West was limited, and so were his contacts with the outside world. Moreover, he shared the jaundiced Libyan view of everything foreign—the view of a people subjected to foreign domination throughout their history. To him, Egypt's Nasser appeared as the greatest contemporary Arab leader; spiritually and politically Qaddafi felt ready to inherit his mantle.

Qaddafi's ideology was thus based on belief in Islam and socialism; on the rejection of both communism and capitalism as systems degrading to man; on the repudiation of imperialism and Zionism; and on advocacy of Arab unity. "There is no socialism in the Arab world," he asserted.

Socialism was brought forward in a serious and real scientific way after the September 1 Revolution only. It is the socialism the principles of which are in the Koran. Other theories are not socialism. Marx did not realize socialism. He brought communism, but this is something else. In the U.S. . . . there is capitalism and this is something else. . . . What exists in other Arab countries is nothing but hesitation between communism, socialism, capitalism, deception and economic failure. This is not our path, which . . . is the socialism that limits capitalist tyranny, helps the poor, converts ownership from perpendicular ownership to horizontal ownership, thus increasing the number of owners rather than lessening them.²

The ideology itself was given the name of the "third theory," with a major effort to propagate it internationally at the International Conference of the Arab and European Youth held in Tripoli in mid-May.

PRACTICAL MOTIVATIONS

In addition to the basic ideological commitment, there were also practical motivations in launching the revolution. Qaddafi was disappointed with the performance of his fellow Libyans: he was angry at their apathy, their evasion of duty and hard work in general, and their preference for easy life.

"It is no secret that the Air Force technicians are being begged from other countries," he complained,

Almost half of your armed forces positions are vacant, in spite of the advertisements we have published. . . . You have nobody to operate the factories currently under construction. The same applies to agriculture and agricultural projects which are being declined by agronomists. We once appointed an engineer from Khoms at Taurga project. But he escaped and we continued the search for him for two months. The day before yesterday, I found that the only physician at Ghadames was a Palestinian, because Libyans do not want to work in Ghadames. . . . The workers of Kufra agricultural project are from Egypt and Tunisia. Even those who are citizens of the area do not want to work in agriculture. They want government jobs.³

Qaddafi was critical of other aspects of Libyan life as well:

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

The rate of crimes and accidents has increased after the revolution. Why? Because I have personally prohibited policemen from carrying pistols or bats or anything. . . . I wanted the police in our country to be similar to countries like Britain. . . . What was the result? Traffic accidents increased. . . . Thefts increased.

He also lashed out at foreign-degree seekers:

There is another disease. Everybody wants to go to the United States to continue his studies. We appoint him at the location where his services are required, but he rejects this because he wants to continue his studies in the United States.⁴

It was, however, Qaddafi's campaign for an early merger with Egypt in the name of Arab unity that gave the most immediate stimulus to his announcement of the popular revolution. Libyans responded to his plea for merger with apathy, suspicion, or outright resentment. Their negative reaction could be ascribed to fear lest the weaker, smaller, and less developed Libya be overwhelmed by Egyptian numbers and sophistication. Aware of their oil-generated wealth, the politically conscious Libyans were apprehensive of the prospect of sharing it with the ever-hungry Egypt. As for the masses, they viewed the large numbers of Egyptian experts employed by Libya (some 150,000 by a conservative estimate) with thinly disguised dislike born of a mixture of envy, scorn, and inferiority.

A good example of this attitude was provided by the events following the destruction of a Libyan airliner by Israeli fighter planes over Sinai in February, 1973. On February 26, protest riots occurred in Libya's second largest city, Benghazi. The paradox of these riots was that they were directed less at Israel than at Egypt, whose government was blamed for causing the deaths of the 106 passengers of the downed airliner either by criminal negligence or by conspiracy. Angry mobs attacked the public relations office of the Egyptian Embassy, the Egyptian Cultural Center, and a hospital, injuring numbers of Egyptian officials, doctors, technicians, and nurses, some of them critically.

Faced with this anti-Egyptian outburst Qaddafi realized that, to achieve union with Cairo, not only would he have to overcome the popular distrust of the Egyptians but he would also have to neutralize the less open but effective political critics of the union in the ranks of the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. These two rather middle-aged groups were ready to accommodate themselves to Libyan reality following the officers' coup of September, 1969, but resisted the abolition of Libya's separate sovereignty through full merger with Egypt.

With these ideological and tactical objectives in mind, the popular revolution was launched on April 15. On the following day, at a rally in Tripoli, Qaddafi announced the formation of the "popular com-

mittees" which were to serve as the main instrument of the revolution. "Brethren," he extorted his audience, "set up people's committees in every village, city, faculty, institute, school, harbor, airport, and popular organization; set up these committees in order to put into implementation the five-point program."⁵ In a subsequent press conference he clarified some points:

The suspension of laws does not mean the cancellation of everything. Courts continue to exist. . . . I would like to cite an example, with someone who cuts down trees on his own farm. It is true that there is a law protecting agricultural lands. The penalty, however, is simple and not repelling. . . . I would, for instance, make him pay 5,000 dinars fine or cut the hand which has cut the trees. I do not want the law to obstruct me. . . .

If I have evidence proving the guilt of people arrested—such as recorded tapes, minutes and confessions that they were paid by [foreign] embassies—why should I therefore waste time by trials, while everything is clear and their guilt is clear? This is a legal revolution. . . .⁶

Qaddafi, furthermore, encouraged the committees to burn "existentialist, reactionary and communist books advocating corruption," "destroy those libraries which harbor rottenness," and "burn and destroy all academic programs which do not abide by our Arab Islamic mentality."⁷ The committees were also given the task of purging objectionable officials and executives in various institutions, public and private.

If the masses, for instance, call for the expulsion of an under-secretary, their opinion will be considered. . . . If they decide that he must take up another job . . . [and] that he must be paid nothing, their opinion will be considered.⁸

POPULAR COMMITTEES

Promptly after these announcements, popular committees were set up in the government offices, universities, schools, airports, harbors, and private firms, including the foreign oil companies. There were no firm rules for their selection or election, thus causing a good deal of confusion in the initial stages. For ex-

ample, a committee elected in an oil company and originally composed of middle-grade and rather well-educated Libyan employees would soon be denounced by other employees as unrepresentative, following which a new, RCC-sanctioned election would take place. If such an election did not produce satisfactory results, it would again be declared void and followed by a third election until a more radical group of lower and discontented employees surfaced as members of the popular committee.

Once formed, the committee would present various demands and threaten or actually use force against the management. The typical demands would include the abolition of some department (such as public relations), the demotion or dismissal of some managers, Libyan or foreign, the denial of accumulated pension rights to the dismissed persons, or the expulsion of a given foreign executive from the country. In addition, the committees would seize the foreign companies' communications facilities, subject higher executives to personal search, and control the entry and exit to and from the premises. One popular committee found Jaffa-marked oranges in the hold of one of the cargo ships bringing supplies to the terminal of one of the oil companies, whereupon the government announced the collusion of the company in smuggling Israeli goods and spies into Libya.

The committees' behavior in the University of Libya (with its branches in Tripoli and Benghazi) was not less assertive. Popular committees composed of students and janitors initiated revision of the curricula, removed and destroyed objectionable books from the libraries, and secured dismissal of a number of professors and a dean for their allegedly subversive teaching.⁹ Moreover, the committees decided to abolish final examinations in the schools of law and education, give all the students passing grades, and terminate the school year several weeks before the usual date so that students might join the work teams or take paramilitary training during the summer months.¹⁰

While the activities of the popular committees obviously interfered with the orderly management of a variety of institutions, the political purpose set forth by Qaddafi was achieved: the committees ferreted out and caused the dismissal of a number of actual or potential critics of the regime; a new group of young militants was given a sense of power and participation and a closer link was forged between the new group and the military group ruling the country. Despite the manifestations of chaos bordering on anarchy in some institutions, the RCC never lost control of the situation, and most of the major decisions taken by the committees, especially regarding personnel, were subject to the RCC's confirmation. An occasional jurisdictional dispute would arise between the popular committees and the Arab Socialist Union

⁵ The Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture. Text of the address delivered by RCC chairman Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi before the masses of the people at the RCC premises in Tripoli, April 16, 1973, p. 11. Subsequently referred to as the Tripoli address.

⁶ *Al-Balagh*, Tripoli, April 19, 1973.

⁷ The Tripoli address, p. 6.

⁸ *Al-Balagh*, op. cit.

⁹ In a personal interview with the students' popular committee in Tripoli in May, 1973, the author ascertained that two dismissed professors were Egyptian and one was an Arab of "uncertain citizenship." They were accused of spreading either Marxist or Muslim Brotherhood ideas.

¹⁰ It is understood that, subsequent to these measures, an official communication was received from France warning Libya's authorities of the difficulties which Libya's students wishing to continue their studies in French universities might encounter due to the lack of proper credentials. Foreseeing such obstacles, certain members of the Tripoli university committee opposed the abolition of examinations but were overruled by the majority.

(ASU), Libya's only licensed political organization.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Alone among the Arab revolutionary states, Libya adhered to a policy of neutralism in the true sense of the word. While strongly critical of the United States, Colonel Qaddafi did not spare the Soviets either. The United States was denounced for its support of Israel, its naval presence in the Mediterranean, and for its "dehumanizing" worship of material goods and power. On March 21, Libyan fighters attacked an American military transport plane (engaged in electronic surveillance) 83 miles from the Libyan coast, but left it unharmed. At the same time, Libya announced the establishment of a 100-mile-wide restricted air zone along her coasts in a move without precedent in international law. Subsequently, Libya complained about the flight of 14 American military jets over her air space on April 30.

As for the Soviets, they were more than once criticized by Colonel Qaddafi for practicing imperialism on a par with the United States and for duplicity in their arms supplies to the Arab states. Moreover, communism was frequently denounced as an atheist doctrine incompatible with Arabism and Islam.

Qaddafi's assertive nationalism was well illustrated by his ban on foreign signs and his demand, voiced early in 1973, that foreign travelers entering Libya should have their passports printed in Arabic or at least—as an interim measure—have the personal data translated into Arabic on officially approved pages attached to passports. While this regulation applied to all countries, it gave rise to special irritation with Washington when a member of the United States Embassy in Tripoli, John R. Countryman, was twice denied reentry into Libya and when another United States diplomatic officer was expelled for trying to help him through the passport formalities.

In her international posture, Libya proclaimed solidarity with the Third World in general and with the anti-imperialist liberation movements in particular. The Libyan revolution, said Qaddafi, "had extended assistance to many peoples fighting for their freedom, in Northern Ireland, in the Philippines, and in the two Americas."¹¹ Libya supported the Irish Catholics, the Philippine Muslims, the Black Muslims and (according to some reports) the Black Panthers in the United States. Libya also supported anti-colonialist guerrillas in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. Her policy, running parallel to that of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, contributed to the growing alienation of sub-Saharan Africa from Israel. (By the fall of 1973, over 20 black African states had severed their diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.) Libya also maintained friendly relations with

North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong not because of their Communist nature but because they were regarded as centers of anti-imperialist resistance.

In this far-flung diplomatic activity, Libya's government enjoyed the advantage of being well provided with funds which were used in the form of loans and grants. No full public accounting of these transactions was given by the government, but occasionally the RCC or Colonel Qaddafi himself would reveal a figure of financial assistance in an individual case. Thus grants and/or loans were given to Chad in December, 1972 (£38 million), to Syria (total of 5 million dinars), to the Black Muslims (\$3 million, with another \$3 million requested), to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and to Egypt, to name just a few of a much larger list of recipients. Of course, friendly Arab countries or groups figured most prominently at the receiving end. Of these, Egypt was enjoying priority ever since the Arab summit conference in Khartoum (August 31, 1967), at which Libya pledged a major annual subsidy to Egypt and Jordan, with two other donors, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. While, due to political differences, Qaddafi stopped his payments to Jordan, he substantially increased his grants to Egypt.

OIL

Libya's financial strength rested, of course, on her oil revenues which permitted her to accumulate a sizable surplus estimated by mid-1973 at \$3 billion. With estimated reserves of 25 billion barrels, Libya's position and oil policy differed in several respects from the policies of other oil-rich states, namely: (a) in contrast to the prevailing pattern in the Middle East, Libya had not given one huge concession to a major foreign company but had purposely signed agreements with many companies of different nationalities (although the United States companies held the most numerous and productive concessions); (b) Libya was close to the European markets, being thus able to avoid major transportation costs and delays, especially after the closing of the Suez Canal in 1967; (c) her oil had a lesser sulphur content, thus making it more desirable to the buyers; (d) Libya's own needs—she has a population of barely 2 million—were limited, thus enabling her to reduce her oil production at will without incurring adverse consequences to her economy.

In a "sellers' market" in the 1970's, Libya clearly could deal in the matter of oil from a position of great strength. Her oil policy had both economic and political motivations. Her economic objective was to secure the most favorable prices and tax revenue—the Tripoli agreements of April 2, 1971, paved the way in this respect—and to acquire a large share in the ownership of the concessionary companies. The share aimed at was 51 percent; Libya achieved it

¹¹ Zvara speech.

either through bilateral agreements, as in the case of Occidental Petroleum Company in the spring of 1973, or through unilateral legislation as that applied to most oil companies on September 1 of that year. Moreover, she adopted a conservation policy limiting her overall production in 1972-1973 to about 2.2 million barrels a day.

Some decisions were politically motivated. This was clear in the case of British Petroleum, whose assets were nationalized in December, 1971, in retaliation for alleged British connivance with Iran in the latter's occupation of three Arab islands in the Strait of Hormuz. A similar political motivation—publicly acknowledged by Colonel Qaddafi—guided Libya in nationalizing on June 11, 1973, an American oil company, Nelson Bunker Hunt. But the most pronounced political move occurred when Libya, along with other Arab states, decided to use the "oil weapon" in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war in October, 1973. In the first place, Libya voted for a minimum five percent monthly cut in production, decided upon by the Arab oil ministers at their meeting in Kuwait on October 17. In the second, she put an embargo on exports to the United States and, later, to Holland in retaliation for their support of Israel. At the same time, she exempted certain friendly countries (such as France which was supplying her with Mirage jet fighters) from the provisions of the boycott.

ARAB POLICY AND UNION WITH EGYPT

Libya's Arab policy was simultaneously unionist and revolutionary. Qaddafi's Pan-Arabism found its expression in his maximalist approach to the problem of Palestine. Israel, according to this view, was an illegitimate creation bound to be abolished by a joint Arab effort. Libya supported and financed the Palestine Liberation Organization; its leader, Yassir Arafat, was a frequent visitor in Tripoli. Colonel Qaddafi, however, criticized the disunity in the ranks of the *fedayeen* and disapproved of those groups among them which had espoused Marxism. While aiming at Arab unity, Qaddafi—like Nasser before him—differentiated between the genuine revolutionary countries and the "reactionary" states which, with their conservative structures and ties with the West, were to be excluded from the schemes of unity. In line with this policy, Qaddafi publicly pledged his support to the rebels who had attempted to overthrow King Hassan of Morocco in August, 1972. By the same token, he strongly denounced both King Hussein of Jordan and the government of Lebanon for their actual or attempted suppression of the Palestinian guerrillas in September, 1970, and May, 1973, respectively.

According to Qaddafi's scale of values, Egypt was clearly the best candidate for union with Libya. Therefore, he had pressed President Sadat for a proc-

lamation of union since early 1972. His objective was a full unconditional merger of the two countries, in which their resources would be blended to create greater Arab strength. Qaddafi considered the Federation of Arab Republics—a loose association which had been formed in April, 1971, grouping Libya, Egypt, and Syria—as clearly insufficient in terms of his unity objectives. His insistence on union led to the signing, with Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, of a preliminary agreement in Benghazi on August 2, 1972, in which the two leaders pledged to effect a merger at the latest by September 1, 1973, the fourth anniversary of the Libyan revolution.

As the year progressed, it became evident that serious differences divided Qaddafi and Sadat. Three of these deserve special mention: First, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sadat was clearly aiming at a peaceful settlement which would restore to Egypt the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. By contrast, Qaddafi favored a total war of liberation against Israel and loudly deplored the fact that his volunteers were denied access to Israel by Egypt and the other adjacent countries. Second, while Sadat was pursuing the policy of Arab solidarity and reconciliation regardless of the nature of the regime in a given country, with emphasis on good relations with conservative Saudi Arabia, Qaddafi preached hostility to a number of unacceptable Arab regimes. Third, while Sadat relaxed, stricter socialist controls introduced by Nasser and favored a more liberal dispensation in both economic and political sectors, Qaddafi was stressing that his "popular revolution" was for export and that he expected it to be extended to Egypt.

With a true dedication to the idea of union, Qaddafi paid an extended three-week visit to Cairo in mid-summer, 1973. There, with Sadat's encouragement, he met various opinion-shaping groups in Egypt, members of the National Assembly and of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, members of professions, journalists, writers, university professors, and women activists. To each group he explained the aims and workings of his popular revolution. The effect of these discussions (or confrontations) was ambivalent: while interested in the

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"With a measure of luck . . . the outlook for Jordan is not unpromising. . . . Compared with many, Jordan's government operates creditably enough; an unanswered question is whether the Jordanian leadership has the capacity to proceed wisely in the months of turbulence and change following the fourth round of Arab-Israeli hostilities."

The Uncertain Kingdom of Jordan

BY NORMAN F. HOWARD

*United States Department of Commerce**

IN THE SEVEN YEARS following its overwhelming defeat by Israel in the June, 1967, war, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has emerged from a period of political and social turmoil to one of relative security and domestic peace. As a result of the bloody civil conflict of September, 1970, the Palestinian guerrillas (*fedayeen*) were liquidated as a significant politico-military force in the country. Despite the predictions of many foreign observers, King Hussein not only escaped assassination and retained his throne but also proceeded energetically to rebuild his troubled land. With the army's loyalty assured, the Palestinians cowed into silence, and other political opponents closely watched, Hussein has begun to concentrate on developing Jordan's unoccupied East Bank. Business confidence has returned, and middle-range economic planning has resumed.

Although occupied by Israel since 1967, Jordan's West Bank has not been totally severed from the rest of the kingdom—trade and travel between the two areas continue—and by the early 1970's the region was experiencing a moderate prosperity under Israeli tutelage. However, the October, 1973, Arab-Israeli war, in which Jordan played a marginal military role, has once again placed the country's political structure and future direction in question.

POLITICS AND THE PALESTINIANS

The critical fact of Jordan's national life in recent years has been the conflict between the indigenous Jordanians, most of them of bedouin tribal back-

ground, and the Palestinian exile community, whose cultural and political aspirations significantly diverge. The 1970 defeat of the *fedayeen*, who had proved more adept at harassing the Jordanian government than in inflicting military damage against Israel, left the East Bank Palestinians leaderless and embittered. Following the defeat, FATAH, the largest commando group, rejected "coexistence" with the Jordanian government. Radical Palestinians argued that Jordan, as well as other "conservative" Arab states, must be revolutionized and her monarchy overthrown in order to provide a firm base for the Palestinian movement. Moreover, FATAH maintained at least some underground cells in east Jordan as well as in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.¹

The most dramatic reflection of Palestinian dissatisfaction with Hashemite rule was the murder in Cairo on November 28, 1971, of Jordan's Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal by members of Black September, a terrorist band growing out of the despair of the 1970 civil war. But this was not the only such incident, and undoubtedly will not be the last. For example, an apparent coup d'état, possibly involving assassination attempts against the King and Hussein's younger brother Crown Prince Hassan, was aborted in November, 1972, with the arrest of several military officers and civilians.² A larger conspiracy against the Amman government was uncovered in early February, 1973. The Palestinian guerrilla leader, Muhammad Dawud Muhammad Udeh (Abu Dawud), and 16 others were implicated and sentenced to death.³ Abu Dawud's "confession" was said to have revealed intimate links between the Black September Organization and FATAH.

In public, King Hussein has minimized his difficulties with his Palestinian subjects, who constitute perhaps 60 percent of Jordan's population. The King refers to his people as one family, undivided by faction or party, and he insists on the "sacred unity"

* The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Commerce.

¹ *The New York Times*, April 21, 1973.

² See *The Economist* (London), December 2, 1972; also the *Middle East Economic Digest*, November 17, 1972, and December 1, 1972.

³ *Middle East Monitor*, vol. 3, April 15, 1973. Abu Dawud's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment shortly afterward, and he and his group were released during the October, 1973 war.

of the two banks of the kingdom. Nonetheless, while Palestinians contribute substantially to the economy, dominating commerce and forming a large part of Jordan's middle class and intellectual elite, they are held suspect by many east Jordanians, who fear their sophistication and ability and doubt their loyalty to the Hussein regime. Moreover, despite the King's evident sympathy for their cause, the Palestinians remain politically underrepresented, if not actually excluded from power. Although perhaps one half of the Cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies are Palestinians, most of the King's close advisers are East Bank Jordanians, as are the senior military commanders. Since 1970, the civil service has been carefully screened and radical Palestinians have been removed. Royalists are thus in full control of public life.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

The King has undertaken several major initiatives to put his house in order and to assuage Palestinian feelings. In September, 1971, the establishment of the Jordanian National Union (later renamed the Arab National Union—ANU), the country's only legal political party, was announced. According to its by-laws, the ANU was designed to end factionalism, mobilize the people, and promote a prosperous, democratic society. Although membership is open to West Bankers, virtually all of them Palestinians, it is doubtful whether the ANU can be effective in strengthening West Bank allegiance to Amman. Even many influential Palestinian residents of the East Bank have proved reluctant to join the organization. Nonetheless, the King, who serves as the party's president, views the ANU as a useful instrument, which helps to advance government policies and programs.

A more critical initiative, with special relevance to the Palestinians, was Hussein's proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, contained in an address to Parliament on March 15, 1972, two weeks before municipal elections on the occupied West Bank. The plan envisaged the restructuring of the Hashemite Kingdom into a federal state composed of two autonomous regions. Amman would become capital of the Trans-Jordan region and remain the national capital, while Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem was designated capital of the future Palestine region. Each region would be administered by a Governor General and Cabinet, with regional legislative authority vested in a popularly elected People's Council. Both regions would have equal representation in the national assembly. The federal government would retain re-

sponsibility for national defense and foreign affairs as well as other matters deemed to be of purely national interest.

Hussein viewed the plan as an effort to advance Palestinian rights and to grant them a measure of self-government if not complete independence. By implication, Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip were free to join the federal kingdom if they so desired and, to that end, the King has attempted to improve his image with the Gazan leadership. Needless to say, the success of the plan is contingent upon peace in the area and some sort of agreement with Israel, which occupies the Palestine region. Although denounced throughout much of the Arab world as a sellout of the Palestinians, the plan was not strongly opposed on the West Bank. A few West Bank intellectuals even expressed cautious approval, although distrust of Hussein remained deeply ingrained, and a few extremists rejected the plan out of hand as emanating from "the butcher of our people."⁴ Opposition was more pronounced in the Gaza Strip.

Viewed as an effort to keep the West Bank Palestinians within the fold, Hussein's initiative was not successful. The 1972 West Bank municipal elections, held under Israeli auspices on March 28 in the north, and on May 2 in the south, were widely interpreted as loosening the ties to Amman, which had initially opposed the balloting.⁵ The elections also underscored the impotence of the *fedayeen*, who were unable to prevent candidates from standing for office. Nonetheless, the results appeared to change little on the West Bank. Incumbents were generally returned in the northern districts, newer men in the southern. Israel remained in full military control: Israeli ground rules precluded the discussion of serious political issues, and region-wide Palestinian leaders did not and probably could not emerge.

Despite continuing friction with the Palestinians, Hussein's policies on the East Bank have begun to bear fruit. Following the assassination of strongman al-Tal, Ahmad Lawzi served as Premier in a "caretaker" role until the appointment on May 26, 1973, of Zayd al-Rifai, at age 36 Jordan's youngest Prime Minister, a Harvard graduate, and a close confidant of the King. Rifai's first Cabinet was composed mainly of younger politicians and technocrats. With Palestinian militancy subdued, and national energies once more being concentrated on political and economic development, King Hussein could state confidently by September, 1973, that "life in our country is again stable."⁶ In September, with the army's 75,000 men in tight control of the country, Hussein felt secure enough to release some 970 Palestinian guerrillas in a general amnesty. The King's limited participation in the October, 1973, war, at least temporarily, raised his political fortunes within Jordan, although the long-term implications are not yet clear.⁷

⁴ Victor Cygielman, "Hussein's Proposal and the West Bank Municipal Elections: A Post-Mortem," *New Outlook*, vol. 15, March-April, 1972, pp. 40-47.

⁵ *The Economist*, May 13, 1972.

⁶ Amman Radio, September 18, 1973.

⁷ *The New York Times*, October 30, 1973, p. 18.

NEW ECONOMIC BEGINNINGS

Jordan's economic foundations are still precarious, with much of the population living at bare subsistence levels. For a poor country, the government spends a huge amount on defense and security—perhaps 40 percent to 50 percent of the budget—and the army and civil service are too large for the kingdom's limited resources.⁸ One-half the government's revenues come from foreign assistance, the main contributors in the early 1970's being Saudi Arabia and the United States. Jordan's population, about 2.5 million in early 1974, is growing rapidly at three percent per year and could double in 20 years. In the view of one specialist, this constitutes "an enormous demographic problem"⁹ which can only be solved by population control and rapid economic growth.

Jordan is unable to feed her entire population, and the prospects for agricultural development are limited. In 1973, approximately 40 percent of the country's wheat requirements had to be imported, mostly from the United States. Furthermore, Jordan's balance of trade seems to be in permanent deficit. To compound these difficulties, unemployment is severe—eight percent on the East Bank—and underemployment is even greater.¹⁰

Despite these problems, the Jordanian economy showed a significant recovery in the early 1970's. Although substantial, damage resulting from the civil war was probably exaggerated, and the country seems to have adjusted fairly well to the indefinite loss of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. According to preliminary reports, national income rose about 4.8 percent in 1972; mining and industrial income was up about 16 percent, while both imports and exports reached record highs—JD95.3 million and JD12.6 million, respectively.¹¹ Exports of phosphates, Jordan's major mineral resource, increased nearly 50 percent in 1972. In order to facilitate its export trade, the Port of Aqaba is being expanded and, with West

German aid, the old Hijaz railroad is being connected to the port. Many other important government projects are underway, such as roadbuilding, rural electrification, bedouin resettlement, and afforestation, the latter said to be making remarkable progress. Moreover, under the direction of the Crown Prince, who has assumed responsibility for internal affairs, the government's administrative machinery is being overhauled and rationalized.

An ambitious three-year development plan for 1973–1975 was announced in November, 1972. It is to provide an annual growth rate of eight percent—more than twice the average rate since 1967—increase employment, and expand social services. Nearly 40 percent of the financing, or about \$148 million in credits, will be required from foreign sources, with the United States and West Germany providing substantial amounts.¹² Transportation projects are to receive the largest share of funds (20 percent), followed by housing and government building (19.5 percent), agriculture (15.5 percent), industry and mining (15.5 percent), municipal and rural affairs (8.2 percent), and education and youth care (6.1 percent).¹³ The agriculture program includes irrigation and afforestation projects as well as plans for improving crop yields and livestock resources. In the Jordan Valley, the country's most productive agricultural region and scene of severe fighting between Jordan and Israel during the 1967–1970 period, the acreage under cultivation is to be doubled, and 90,000 farmers, mainly Palestinian refugees, are to be resettled.

Although it is too early to gauge the success of these programs, Jordan has used her foreign aid to good advantage in the past. Barring unforeseen catastrophes, gradual progress should continue. The October, 1973 war, which was not fought on Jordanian soil, apparently has resulted in few economic dislocations; and Kuwait has rewarded Jordan for her participation in the conflict by resuming her \$40-million yearly payment to the kingdom, suspended in 1970.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ENTANGLEMENTS

A shrewd observer of Middle Eastern realities, King Hussein has stayed in power longer than any other Arab head of state, and he has played his few diplomatic cards skillfully. As an "invisible part of the Arab nation" and the Muslim world, Jordan has made a considerable effort to build bridges to fraternal Islamic states. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, for example, Jordanian military aircraft were transferred to Pakistan. Jordan has also provided needed military training to several Persian Gulf states, and Jordanian officers have been posted to Oman to help Sultan Qabus in his fight against the Dhofar rebels.

Nonetheless, for much of the 1970–1973 period, Jordan was painfully isolated from her Arab neigh-

⁸ For varying estimates of Jordan's defense spending, see article by Jean-Pierre Mithois in *Le Figaro*, March 14, 1972; Neville Brown, "After the Showdown: Jordan Is on the Move," *New Middle East*, September, 1972, pp. 20–24; *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 12, 1973.

⁹ W. B. Fisher, "Jordan: A Demographic Shatterbelt," pp. 202–219, in J. I. Clarke and W. B. Fisher, eds., *Populations of the Middle East and North Africa: A Geographical Approach* (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1972).

¹⁰ *The Economist*, December 9, 1972. Full employment prevails on the occupied West Bank, largely because Israel has permitted some 40,000 West Bank laborers to work inside Israel. Nonetheless, the West Bank cost of living reportedly has gone up 300 percent since 1967. *Op. cit.*, March 18, 1972, p. 49.

¹¹ *Middle East Economic Digest*, May 4, 1973; June 8, 1973.

¹² Other major foreign contributors include the World Bank—International Development Association, the United Nations Development Program, and the United Kingdom. The Jordanian private sector is scheduled to provide 44 percent of plan investments, but this is perhaps too ambitious.

¹³ *Middle East Economic Digest*, December 1, 1972.

bors, while relations with Israel remained difficult. As a result of the King's policy toward the *fedayeen*, Syria and Iraq closed their borders with Jordan in July, 1970, and Kuwait and Libya suspended their annual subsidies during the civil war, thereby severely damaging the Jordanian economy.¹⁴ Moreover, relations with Egypt also deteriorated with President Anwar el-Sadat breaking relations in April, 1972, in protest against Hussein's Palestine plan. During the summer of 1973, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba suggested that Jordan be replaced by a Palestinian state, a statement that was immediately denounced by Hussein.¹⁵ President Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya went so far as to call Hussein a coward and, prior to the King's joining the Syrian war effort, the Libyan radio called for his overthrow.¹⁶ These setbacks were not critical, however, principally because ties with wealthy Saudi Arabia remained strong. Saudi military forces remained in Jordan, and Saudi financial payments continued on schedule.

Central to Jordan's diplomatic position has been the relationship with the United States, Jordan's primary economic and military supplier. Since the grim days following the 1967 conflict and the 1970 civil war, popular anti-Americanism has diminished. The King himself remains strongly "pro-Western," and visited United States President Richard Nixon in Washington in February, 1972, and again in February, 1973; United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger also conferred with Hussein in Amman on November 8, 1973, to exchange views on the recent war. For its part, the United States views Jordan as a moderate force in the area. After a four-year cut-off, Washington resumed its budgetary support of Jordan in 1971; financial assistance totaled \$50 million in FY1972/73 and an increase to \$65 million was projected for FY1973/74. United States military aid totaled \$34 million in 1972/73; however, plans for further military modernization, which had received American support early in 1973, could be hindered by Jordan's participation in the October, 1973, war.

United States aid for Jordan has been contingent

upon the latter's "soft" policy toward Israel. Indeed, since the 1970 civil war, Jordan has prohibited any guerrilla activities against Israel from her soil. The King not only deplored the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games in September, 1972, but also expressed condolences to their families. On several occasions, Hussein declared his opposition to further military confrontation with Israel, suggesting that it might lead to the destruction of the Arab world. Even pro-Zionist observers have referred to Jordan's "discreet coexistence" with Israel during the early 1970's.¹⁷ Strong suspicions exist, for instance, that ranking Jordanians and perhaps even the King have met secretly with high Israeli officials. Moreover, Hussein has occasionally hinted that he might negotiate a separate settlement with Israel, regardless of Egyptian wishes, although this was expressly denied by Prime Minister Rifai in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies on June 11, 1973.¹⁸

Jordan's moderate course has received little overt consideration in Israel. Prime Minister Golda Meir vehemently denounced Hussein's United Arab Kingdom plan as "a pretentious and one-sided statement . . . liable to spur on all the extremist elements whose aim is war against Israel."¹⁹ Although Israel's military presence on the occupied West Bank is not conspicuous, it is clear that many Israelis, including Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, want the West Bank to remain under permanent Israeli military control. While Hussein might accept demilitarization of the West Bank in return for its transfer to Jordanian sovereignty, he probably cannot relinquish his guardianship of the Arab sector of Jerusalem, the Holy and Noble City.²⁰ He does not appear to desire the reestablishment of a divided city, but rather an open administration in which Jordan would have a role in municipal affairs and urban development.

For their part, the West Bank Palestinians want Israel to withdraw, and contacts between them and Israelis remain limited. Friction has been growing over Israeli expropriation of Arab land, particularly in East Jerusalem and in Hebron, where Muslim concern for the Ibrahimi Mosque (venerated by Jews as the site of the tomb of the patriarchs), is potentially explosive.²¹ East Jerusalem Arabs remain Jordanian citizens—very few if any have become Israelis—yet they pay taxes to Israel and are entitled to vote in municipal elections. Their wages have reportedly reached parity with those of Israeli Jews, but the

(Continued on page 86)

¹⁴ Iraq reopened her border after three months, while Syria reopened her frontier and removed all trade restrictions in December, 1972. As noted above, Kuwait has resumed her payments to Jordan; Libya has not.

¹⁵ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, July 27, 1973.

¹⁶ *The Washington Post*, October 9, p. A6.

¹⁷ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, March 9, 1973.

¹⁸ *Middle East Economic Digest*, June 15, 1973.

¹⁹ Statement to the Knesset, March 16, 1972, in *New Middle East*, no. 44, May, 1972, pp. 49-50.

²⁰ See Neville Brown, "After the Showdown," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²¹ Some 10,000 Israeli Jews now reside in Jerusalem's Arab sector; about 1,000 live in a new town on the outskirts of Hebron. Another 16 military settlements exist on the West Bank.

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"... in a year in which nearly every Middle Eastern country experienced domestic or international turmoil, Iran somehow insulated herself. Having achieved a fundamental understanding with the superpowers on the desirability of maintaining her status quo, Iran has steadily asserted her major role in the Persian Gulf."

Iran Today

BY SEPEHR ZABIH

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THE PREVAILING THRUST of recent Iranian political developments is the interrelated quest for prosperity and security. Pursuance of these aims has elevated foreign and economic issues to higher levels than domestic political issues. This is particularly true because the continuity and stability of the regime have encountered only insignificant challenge from so-called urban guerrillas, whose ideological orientation and foreign ties are somewhat unclear. Primacy of foreign policy above all has meant continuous efforts to maintain a manageable balance in the triangular relationship between Iran and the two superpowers.

Despite outward cordiality, Iranian relations with the Soviet Union have been characterized by a lingering mistrust that a decade of normalization since 1962 has not totally dissipated. The three sources of this mistrust have been (1) the prospect of the ascendancy of Soviet interest in nearby nations, notably India, Iraq, and Afghanistan, to the extent that potential conflicts of interests might tempt the Soviets to sacrifice their stake in normal and correct Iranian-Soviet relations; (2) the possibility that the search for a permanent and genuine détente in Soviet-American relations might proceed on a course detrimental to Iranian aspirations, especially in the Persian Gulf region; and (3) the conviction that the traditional Soviet aspirations of a drive toward the warm seas might be reasserted in a policy of expansion in the gulf and in the Indian Ocean for both strategic and economic reasons.

To cope with these concerns, Iran's policy-makers have manifested a consistent and intense interest in

not unduly antagonizing the Soviet Union. Apart from the diplomatic undesirability of a return to a pre-1962 state of affairs, Iran has acquired profound economic and trade ties with her northern neighbor which could not be lightly dismissed. A most tangible evidence of the economic benefits of Soviet-Iranian cooperation was the completion of the Soviet-built steel mill near Isfahan in March, 1973.¹

THE CHINESE CONNECTION

In its desire to neutralize Soviet pressure on its western flank the government not only relies on its traditional Western allies but also responds positively to the opportunity of utilizing China as a countervailing force.

That the Chinese would welcome such an opportunity became clear during the official visit to Teheran in June, 1973, of Peng-fei, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic, who expressed support for Iran's military build-up as a natural and logical response to any potential threat of subversion or expansion in the Persian Gulf. He fully supported the long-standing Iranian contention that only littoral gulf states should assume responsibility for gulf security.

In a barely veiled reference to Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, the Iranian Foreign Minister voiced support for the Iran-Sri Lanka-sponsored resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace; he characterized the resolution as "a legitimate demand to combat certain big powers which are fighting over hegemony and are seeking to cut spheres of influence for themselves."²

As for the other superpower, Iran seems to continue to enjoy a most cordial relationship with the United States. Having espoused the Nixon doctrine of self-help, Iran has sought to secure United States support in two specific areas. One is the matter of arms procurement and Iran's need to strengthen her military capability. The other is the related Iranian objective of becoming almost the sole guardian of security in

¹ The initial capacity of the mill is five million tons annually. The fifth development plan projects a progressive increase to 12 million tons by 1980. Other tangible results of Soviet-Iranian cooperation have included the acquisition of approximately \$400-million worth of mostly non-sophisticated arms from the Soviet Union from 1965 to 1972.

² *Iran-Tribune*, Teheran, vol. VIII, no. 106, July, 1973, p. 7.

the Persian Gulf, an aim prompted by the termination of the British presence in the gulf in early 1971.

Iranian Shah Riza Pahlevi has found general support in both areas in Washington. The two-billion-dollar arms deal and the formal statement concerning Iran's responsibility in the gulf, stressed during the Shah's visit to Washington in July, point to the emergence of Iran as one of the most reliable states in the Middle East. Undoubtedly the energy crisis and the oil needs of the Western powers and Japan have reinforced Iranian pressure vis-à-vis Washington.

It is a remarkable commentary on changing Iranian security priorities over the last two decades that Iran's view of the United States as a balancing counterweight to the Soviet Union is no longer considered the primary determinant of Iran's posture toward the two superpowers.

Instead, occasional apprehension about a possible sacrifice of Iranian interest in the event of a genuine détente between the two superpowers has been the only area of stress in United States-Iranian relations, and has resulted in sporadic half-hearted attempts to revive the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) alliance.

Renewed interest in CENTO also stems from a sense of isolation in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and the more recent conclusion of the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty. At its annual conference of Foreign Ministers in Teheran in June, 1973, Iran's Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda conveyed the Shah's message on reappraising CENTO in view of changes in international relations. In the deliberations it became obvious that the CENTO countries viewed the détente in superpower relations as insufficient inducement for abandoning existing regional defense alliances. As far as Iran was concerned, the hard core of CENTO was the security of the Persian Gulf rather than the protection of the vast Northern Tier region against the threat of external aggression. United States Secretary of State William Rogers stressed that détente in Soviet-American relations would ultimately strengthen the security of the CENTO region.³

While these concerns may be genuine, there is little evidence that the government's renewed interest in CENTO marks a revision of its fundamental stance in the bipolar conflict which is based on a desire to maintain a correct balance in relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. The regular summit meetings with both superpowers have become routine. Thus, a month after the Shah paid his annual visit to

Washington in July, 1973, the Prime Minister visited Moscow. In that visit, the Prime Minister sought to strengthen the 15-year Cooperation Treaty signed in 1972, and reportedly secured assurances that Iran's interests would not be overshadowed by Soviet attempts to reach a détente with Washington.⁴ More pressing foreign policy problems continued to reflect a pronounced regional focus.

REGIONAL POLITICS

On the regional level, relations with her Arab neighbors have been Iran's chief concern. In the Persian Gulf area, these relations were consolidated in 1971-1972 when the resolution of the Bahrain problem and the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs allowed Iran to reorganize the Union of Arab Emirates encompassing seven of the original Persian Gulf sheikdoms. With Iraq, however, relations remained strained until the eve of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October, 1973. At the heart of the Iranian-Iraqi disputes lie bilateral issues like the Shat-el Arab dispute and the Kurdish problem as well as the question of Soviet ties with both states.

While these issues remained dormant in recent years, Soviet-Iraqi ties have never ceased to disquiet Iran. The Iraqi championship of the cause of Arab radicalism in the gulf has further aggravated Iranian concern. On the eve of the fourth Arab-Israeli war, the Iraqis initiated a rapprochement with Iran because of their military involvement in that war. Iran reacted favorably to this initiative, and normal ties were reestablished. Thus, the imperative of the Arab-Israeli dispute once again benefited Iran, as it had in the wake of the 1967 war. At that time, Egypt had taken the initiative for the normalization of ties with Iran, so that her energies would not be deflected from total concentration on the dispute with Israel.

INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

In the wake of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Iranian sympathies usually favor Pakistan, while maintaining fairly cordial relations with both India and Pakistan. This is largely due to strategic rather than cultural or religious affinities. In the Iranian view, a weak and disintegrated Pakistan would seriously threaten Iran's southwestern frontier region where Baluchi tribes inhabit territories of both countries. Sensitive to the potential of any new separatist movement in this area, Iran has come out squarely for the prevention of any further disintegration of Pakistan's territorial integrity. In February, the Shah stated that: "From the point of view of Iran's well-being it is not possible for us to be observers to another blow against the territorial integrity of Pakistan."⁵

³ *Keyhan International*, Teheran, June 17, 1973.

⁴ For an account of this visit see "Collective Security," *Iran-Tribune*, Teheran, Vol. VIII, No. 108, September, 1973, p. 4.

⁵ *Keyhan International*, Teheran, February 21, 1973.

In early 1972, when the Baghdad regime provided refuge to dissident Baluchi leaders and joined in a propaganda assault designed to incite a Baluchi separatist movement, Iran reacted sharply. During his visit to Washington in July, the Shah openly declared that Iran would aid Pakistan if she were attacked. Among other considerations, this statement seemed to put Iran on the side of the Chinese with regard to the Indian sub-continent and in opposition to the so-called Moscow-New Delhi axis fostered by the 1971 Soviet-Indian friendship treaty.

Indian concern about these developments prompted a visit to Teheran in July by Indian Foreign Minister Sirdar Swarni Singh in which assurances were sought that Iran's support of Pakistan would not incite aggressive posture toward India. More specifically, India was apprehensive about Iran's American-purchased armaments finding their way to Pakistan and thereby upsetting what India euphemistically calls the "military balance" in the sub-continent.⁶

Having initiated the mediation of the Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute over Pakhtunistan in 1962, the Shah is now eager to see that a weaker Pakistan and a Republican Afghanistan do not renew that potentially disintegrative dispute. His concern was instrumental in a prompt recognition of the new Republican regime in Kabul and the closing of ranks between Pakistan and Iran.

Anxiety over closer ties between Moscow and New Delhi stems from the Iranian concern for Pakistan's territorial integrity as well as the ramification of the naval ascendancy of the two states in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Iranian policy toward the Persian Gulf has been gradually extended to the Indian Ocean, which is considered a logical extension of the country's security. To insure that its vital sea lane beyond the gulf will remain unhampered, the government has tried to convince all Indian Ocean powers to declare that ocean a neutral zone of peace. While India has not so far consented to this, such nonlittoral powers as China and Sri Lanka have given their prompt support.⁷

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

In 1973, the government marked the end of the decade of the White Revolution, the series of socio-economic reform programs inaugurated in January, 1963. In the course of numerous ceremonies some attention was paid to the prospect of forming a genuine two-party system. The Shah told an interviewer that in the second decade of the Shah-and-People

Revolution the duties of the political parties would be much greater. He also emphasized that Iran would not become a one-party state, "which usually leads to dictatorship." There must be at least one party which out of office, acts as a minority party and carefully watches the work of the executive.⁸

In reality, however, the ultimate political control rests with the sovereign, whose ability successfully to neutralize all forces of genuine opposition has been a cornerstone of the continuity and stability of the existing political system in the last two decades. This is not to say that existing parties do not perform any social or political function. In effect parties, along with government-sponsored trade unions, have become pressure groups through which access to the system of distribution of rewards is obtained.

The absence of a major domestic political issue has permitted the government to continue its efforts to maximize the capabilities of the state by a steady increase in oil revenue and an equally determined policy of enhancing Iran's military potential.

Throughout 1972 and 1973, the question of a new oil arrangement with the Consortium to replace the 1954 agreement (due to expire in 1989), occupied the center of Iranian governmental attention. On March 21, 1973, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, which also corresponds with the anniversary of the 1951 Nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Shah announced the complete takeover of the Iranian oil industry. Following several months of intensive negotiations, in early summer a new 20-year agreement with the Western Oil Consortium was signed with the following basic provisions:

1. All exploration, extraction and refining activities and installations are to come under Iranian control. A service company registered in Iran and subject to Iranian regulations will perform certain technical functions in relation to exploration and extraction for a period of five years only.

2. Control of all oil reserves is to be transferred from the former consortium of Iran. This provision "will certainly lead to an increase in recoverable reserves, despite the fact that this will require massive investment."

3. Iran assumes the rights to all gas reserves in the Agreement Area and complete control of gas exports, with an option open to the former consortium to secure a 50 percent share of the operation for the export of gas through Persian Gulf ports.

4. In the event of disputes arising out of the agreement, solutions will be reached on the basis of Iranian law. Interpretation of the clauses of the agreement will also be made according to Iranian law. Privileges or advantages accorded to other Persian Gulf oil producing nations will also be applied to Iran.

⁶ *Iran-Tribune*, Teheran, vol. VIII, no. 107, August, 1973, pp. 7-8.

⁷ A joint Iran-Sri Lanka resolution on this was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1972.

⁸ The Shah's statement was reported in a June 15, 1973, interview with *Nedaye-Irane Novin*, since 1965 the organ of the ruling party of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda.

5. Iran is guaranteed per-barrel profits at least equal to those secured by other Persian Gulf oil-producing states.⁹

Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda told Parliament that after 23 years the Nationalization Act has been implemented in its fullest sense. Additional efforts to increase Iranian revenue also continued. One effort through OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) negotiations was designed to increase the price of oil per barrel for all member states. The other was directed at the formation of new, full participation agreements with companies outside the consortium. Significant success was achieved on both levels when, in October, 1973, the OPEC conference meeting in Kuwait approved a 17 percent hike in the posted price of crude oil per barrel.

Similarly, during his last visit to the United States, the Shah formally announced an agreement with the Ashland Oil Company of Ohio based on 50-50 participation in Ashland down-stream operations. This agreement calls for refining 150,000 barrels of crude oil daily and marketing it "right down to the petrol pump." It gives participation to NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) in refining and marketing as well as part ownership in Ashland's New York State operations.

Currently, Iran's production of 5.5 million barrels a day is second only to Saudi Arabia's production of 8 million barrels daily. The most authoritative projection is that by 1975 Iran's production will be 7.3 million barrels per day with an annual revenue of about \$4.7 billion. By 1980, the figures will be respectively, 10 million and about \$12.8 billion. If the expected price hike resulting from devaluation and inflation is taken into account, the estimated revenue will be about 10 percent higher.¹⁰

Coming at a time when Arab oil states have decided to use oil as a political weapon, Iran's refusal to do so was particularly reassuring to the Western world. Two basic reasons underlie Iran's position. First, Iran is not an Arab country and therefore does not feel the pressure Arab oil states are exposed to in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Indeed, under a comprehensive agreement worked out in early 1962 between Israeli Finance Minister Levi Eshkol and the NIOC, Iran has supplied crude oil for Israeli consumption. The oil had been regularly transported to the Israeli port of Elath, but the October Arab-Israeli War and the

reported Egyptian blockade of Bab-el Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea stopped its flow temporarily.

Second, when Iran was involved in a bitter struggle over the nationalization of oil in 1951-1953, she received no support from Arab oil-producing countries. And several Persian Gulf states (notably Kuwait and Iraq) more than made up for the loss of Iranian oil to the Anglo-Oil Company by increasing production.

It is likely that Iran will further increase her production to replace the current boycott of Arab oil to the United States, which amounts to about 11 percent of the annual United States consumption. However, the government is mindful of changes in the cost and revenue situation which might necessitate a more cautious approach, because an increase in production to meet a foreign emergency may risk the loss of more lucrative future benefits once the emergency is over.

In February, 1973, a major step was taken in increased military expenditures when a \$2-billion arms procurement agreement was signed with the United States. In vigorous defense of this measure, the Shah told an American television audience in July that the purchase of weapons was a clear sovereign right of an independent country. Just as small Scandinavian or Benelux countries were entitled to their purchases, so was Iran within her right.¹¹ In a hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, former Secretary of State William Rogers supported this line of reasoning.

NEW ECONOMIC PLAN

The Iranian New Year, March 21, 1973, signaled the inauguration of the fifth seven-year development plan. The plan called for the allocation of \$32 billion but was shortly increased to \$36 billion as a result of increased oil revenue. This meant a greater emphasis on such heavy industries as steel, petroleum, copper, and aluminum.

Other features of the fifth plan submitted to the Parliament in January included a projected increase from \$513 to \$907 in annual per capita income by 1980.

Records indicated that during the third and fourth

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⁹ The gist of the government report on the new oil agreement may be found in "A New Oil Concept," in *Iran-Tribune*, vol. VIII, no. 107, August, 1973, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ James Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. LI, no. 3, April, 1973, pp. 462-490.

¹¹ Interview on "Meet the Press," N.B.C., as reported in *Teheran Journal*, Teheran, July 25, 1973.

"There is no end in sight for the Arab-Israeli arms race, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the suppliers from their surrogates."

The Arab-Israeli Arms Race and the Superpowers

BY RONALD M. DEVORE

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THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS expended far more time and effort on the arms race than on the search for peace during the years from the 1967 Six Day War to October, 1973. The Arab-Israeli conflict became the area of the most intense and sophisticated arms race in the world, except for Europe, where NATO and the Warsaw Pact confront each other. The Arab-Israeli arms race resulted in an ever deepening involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Mideast regional conflict. This brief examination of the major developments in the arms race during a period of slightly over six years reveals a general pattern in the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union to Israel and the Arab states.

The pattern reflects an increasing commitment, formal or informal, on the part of the superpowers to their "client" states. This is a relationship which is only partially due to the necessary interaction which must take place between the supplier of weapons and the recipient. The supplier-purchaser relationship is well known. But vital and complex questions must be posed. To what extent do supplying nations become captives of the weapons they supply? Rationally or irrationally, to what extent does the performance of supplied weapons reflect upon the interests and international reputation of a superpower in the world power balance? If the national ego of the supplying power becomes associated with the recipient's weapons use, does the recipient become a surrogate for the supplier?

This situation is different from the accepted use of a client state as a test-bed for weapons systems, as Spain served Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union during the 1930's. In the nuclear age, a surrogate relationship has far graver implications for superpower involvement than the concept of testing weapons systems. The events of October-November, 1973,

demonstrate that Israel and the Arab states are treated by their patrons as clients far more important than mere recipients of items available for sale.

ORIGINS OF INVOLVEMENT

The Arab-Israeli conflict which followed the creation of Israel and the Palestine War of 1948 was regarded as a tinderbox capable of igniting a serious war. In 1950, the major Western powers, Great Britain, France, and the United States, concluded a tripartite agreement which included an understanding to limit the flow of arms to participants in the conflict. The agreement had no effective means of enforcement and omitted one obvious potential supplier of weapons, the Soviet Union. The tripartite agreement appears to have been operative for about three years, until it was effectively subverted by Israel's efforts to acquire arms that she regarded as necessary for the security of the new state. Israel's success became evident when, in February, 1955, the Israelis launched a retaliatory raid into the Gaza Strip. The defending Egyptian forces were outgunned and suffered many casualties. The new revolutionary regime in Egypt, under Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, sought arms to redress the imbalance. Western sources refused to sell arms to Egypt, but the Soviet Union sanctioned an agreement between Czechoslovakia and Egypt for the supply of jet aircraft and armored vehicles as well as small arms. The arms race was under way and has continued to spiral.

The British, French, and Israelis launched an invasion of the Sinai peninsula and the Suez Canal area in October, 1956, before Egypt could effectively incorporate the newly purchased arms into her military structure. Egyptian aircraft were destroyed by British and French attacks, and the Egyptian army suffered serious losses. The war resulted from Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which was

Egypt's reaction to the refusal of the Western powers to finance the Aswan Dam project. The allied forces won a military victory. But the allies were forced to withdraw from the Sinai and the Suez Canal Zone as a result of pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Following the withdrawal, the area arms race was renewed with great vigor. Between 1956 and 1967, Egypt and Israel succeeded in amassing an impressive array of equipment. Egypt, soon joined by Syria and Iraq as arms recipients, remained dependent on the Soviet Union or Eastern bloc countries for her weapons. The weapons the Arab states were permitted to purchase were generally of good quality but usually were not equal to the first-line equipment of Soviet forces. There were exceptions. MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft, which were still an integral part of the Soviet air defense network, were supplied. T-54/55 tanks, which made up the bulk of the Soviet armored forces, appeared in Arab inventories. These weapons were scheduled for eventual replacement in the Soviet force structure and were the only items in their category available for export. The intensity of the race quickened in the mid-1960's, and the Egyptian armed forces expanded considerably while participating on the republican side in the civil war in Yemen.

Israel had somewhat more difficulty in acquiring arms supplies, but through ingenuity and adaptability she managed to forge a tremendously powerful force. Aircraft became of prime concern in the desert warfare environment, and the air force received highest priority. France became the supplier of aircraft to Israel with the apparent encouragement of the United States. The Israelis were able to purchase French aircraft as they evolved during the decade between the 1956 and 1967 wars. Eventually, the Israelis acquired the French Mirage III, an excellent multi-role supersonic aircraft. Although relatively small in numbers, the Israeli air force equipment was good and flight and maintenance crews were highly trained. Israeli ground forces were equipped with a hodgepodge of equipment. The equipment was in no way inferior, but it lacked uniformity. The Israeli armored corps consisted of British and French tanks and United States M-47/48 tanks purchased from West Germany.

When the Six Day War broke out in June, 1967, the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were equipped with Soviet materiel. The relatively small forces of the other Arab participant, Jordan, were supplied with Western arms. The Israelis had a French-made air

force, while Israeli land forces were equipped with weapons from many sources.¹

THE SIX DAY WAR AND AFTERMATH

Tension surrounding the Arab-Israeli impasse built up rapidly during May and June, 1967. Dramatically at dawn on June 5, 1967, the Israelis launched air attacks on airfields in three Arab countries. Within three hours Israel's air force had won a war by destroying over 300 Arab aircraft while they sat on the ground. The Israelis gained total control of the air and it was merely a question of time before Israeli ground forces supported by the air force defeated the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armed forces.

The world was shocked at the swiftness and totality of the Israeli victory. The critical importance of air power in desert warfare was reaffirmed. French aircraft, especially the Mirage, acquired an excellent image in the world armaments market. The Arabs suffered a humiliating defeat, and much of the onus rubbed off or was passed on to the Soviet equipment and tactics the Egyptians had attempted to use. Soviet equipment appeared to be no match for the equipment possessed by the Israelis. The Soviets, who trained the armies in tactics and in the use of their equipment, appeared inept and unable to adapt to conditions of desert warfare. To be sure, some Soviet equipment was inferior and some Soviet advice was unwise. But the Soviets had not considered training and advising a major responsibility and had contented themselves with selling equipment and providing tactical doctrine. Soviet tactical doctrine,² Soviet equipment, and Soviet advisers emerged from the Six Day War with a serious black eye.

In one week, Egypt lost most of her military power, and Syria suffered serious losses. The reputation of the Soviet Union plummeted in the Arab world. But the concern of Egyptians and Syrians was how to rebuild some semblance of a military force. To change suppliers—assuming this was possible—would have been extremely expensive and would have further weakened the capability of the limited forces remaining during the period of change. The Soviet Union demonstrated an immediate willingness to resupply the Arab armies. The Soviets even offered to resupply Jordan when King Hussein found it difficult to acquire replacement equipment in the West. The Soviet offer to Jordan was rejected, but the Soviet Union salvaged much of its damaged image by resupplying Egypt and Syria. Of special impact was the use of an airlift to move in equipment during the dark days of July, 1967, when the Arabs felt defenseless. The resupply of Arab countries actually resulted in a qualitative improvement in arms because of the nature of the equipment then available from the Soviet Union. T-55 tanks replaced World War II

¹ For the best discussion of the arms race during this period see Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

² The tactical doctrine adopted by the Egyptians evolved during the 1950's and was not the 1967 doctrine of the Soviet forces, but the tarnished image of Soviet tactics remained.

vintage T-34's. MIG-21 and SU-7 aircraft replaced older MIG-15's and MIG-19's.

Soviet motives remain a matter of conjecture, but the Soviets clearly wished to maintain the limited advantages they had gained by supplying equipment to the Arabs. They could argue that from the point of view of Moscow all that had been lost was equipment which could be replaced. But the Soviet military image had been damaged and this could not be recouped simply by sending more materiel which might be lost to the opponent. To prevent this possibility, the number and quality of Russian advisers were increased.

It is ironic that in some ways the victor of the Six Day War faced more difficult procurement problems than the vanquished. Israel found herself cut off from her source of aircraft when President Charles de Gaulle of France refused to deliver 50 Mirage V aircraft, which Israel had arranged to purchase prior to the war. The Mirage V is an improved ground attack version of the Mirage III. But the French monopoly of supplying aircraft to Israel had already been broken in 1966 when the United States agreed to permit the purchase of A-4 Skyhawk fighter bombers.³ This contract was the first major step leading toward a situation in which the United States became the major supplier of weapons to Israel. The Jewish state sought to replace lost armor by purchasing the new British Chieftain tank but was again rebuffed. Thus Israel was forced to turn increasingly to the United States for major weapons systems. And the United States was no longer able to avoid playing the role of direct supplier of major weapons to Israel by the use of third-party states, as was the case up to 1966.

The image of Soviet weaponry was slightly improved when, in October, 1967, the Israeli destroyer Elath was sunk in the Mediterranean by four Styx missiles fired from an Egyptian-manned, Soviet-made patrol boat in the harbor of Port Said.⁴ This event resulted in some very critical rethinking of concepts of naval warfare. A small, fast, missile-firing boat succeeded in sinking a major surface vessel with four direct hits out of four missiles launched. Countries investing vast sums in large surface ships began to question the wisdom of such expenditures.

Throughout 1968, Israel and the Arab nations pushed forward their efforts to increase their military capabilities. Perhaps the most dramatic escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race occurred in December, 1968, when United States President Lyndon Johnson

agreed to the sale of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel. The Phantom is the best multi-role combat aircraft in the world. Its capabilities far outstrip any other aircraft in the Middle East arena. It has the capacity to fly at 60,000 feet at twice the speed of sound. But the Phantom is most devastating in its role as a ground attack aircraft, because it can carry up to 16,000 pounds of bombs. One Phantom can deliver to Cairo West airfield six times the ordnance a Mirage III could in 1967.⁵ The use of Cairo West as a reference point by the Israelis makes the Egyptians understandably uneasy. The Phantom also possesses a combat radius of up to 900 miles, depending on the mission it is conducting. The Phantom added new dimensions to Israel's already potent air force and the Arabs protested these sales, but to no avail. The administration of United States President Richard Nixon, having succeeded President Johnson within one month of his announcement, moved the United States further into the role of the major supplier to Israel, adding new ground equipment.

WAR OF ATTRITION AND CEASE-FIRE

The massive accumulation of Arab and Israeli weapons did not remain idle. Sporadic fighting continued. President Nasser declared a "war of attrition" against Israel in July, 1969, hoping to inflict continuing severe losses on the Israelis in order to make their position untenable. The arena of war was the Suez Canal front, where massed Egyptian artillery pounded at Israeli positions on the east bank while the Israelis countered with air strikes. This static warfare was extremely frustrating to the mobility-minded Israelis. But soon they had a weapon they hoped would break the stalemate. The first Phantoms were delivered in September, 1969, and by January, 1970, Israel had enough to launch air raids, attacking military bases and factories, deep in the Nile Valley and the Delta. Egypt's air defenses could not stop these deep penetration raids and a serious military and political crisis developed within Egypt.

President Nasser turned to his Soviet suppliers for help. The response was probably more than Nasser expected. The Soviets sent 15,000 men into Egypt to operate aircraft, radar systems, and complex anti-aircraft missiles. Faced with a possible confrontation with Soviet forces, Israel halted deep penetration raids in April, 1970. Thus the introduction of a new weapons system, Phantom aircraft, by the Israelis, prompted the direct intervention of one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union, to protect its client, Egypt.

The scene of the fighting shifted back to the Suez Canal front, which ran the length of the canal and extended westward about 20 miles into Egypt. The intensity of the Israeli bombing increased, inflicting high casualties on Egyptian forces. But the Egyptians,

³ "Israeli A-4 Buy," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, May 30, 1966, p. 26.

⁴ Robert D. Colvin, "Aftermath of the Elath," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (October, 1969) reprinted in *Survival* (January, 1970) vol. XII, no. 1, pp. 7-12.

⁵ "Interview with Brigadier General M. Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Forces—Air Force," NBC News, July 9, 1970.

with the aid of Soviet technicians and advisers, began building and systematically advancing toward the canal front a missile air defense system consisting of SA-2 Guideline missiles, effective at high and medium altitudes, and SA-3 Goa missiles, effective at low and medium altitudes. This was the first time the SA-3 had appeared outside the Soviet Union except for its deployment in East Germany. The Soviets were providing some of their most advanced weapons to the Egyptians. The previous Egyptian missile defenses along the canal, based on the SA-2 system, had been destroyed by the Israelis. The new Egyptian missile network was built in such a way that the missile sites were mutually supporting. Israeli bombing to counter these moves cost the Israelis some aircraft and forced them to divert resources from the immediate canal front. Because the Israelis were bombing missile sites which were encroaching within 20 miles of the canal, they did not have aircraft available to bomb artillery positions in the immediate vicinity of the canal. Thus, Israel was unable to halt the forward expansion of the missile defense system.⁶

Israeli efforts along the canal were further complicated by the appearance of another new Soviet weapon, the SA-7 Grail. The SA-7 is a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rocket which one man can launch. The SA-7's use was kept secret by both the Arabs and Israelis until two years later; it received its first public notice when the North Vietnamese employed it during their 1972 offensive. Effective at very low altitudes, the SA-7 forced the high-performance Israeli aircraft to alter their attack methods. Although its effectiveness against high-performance aircraft is somewhat questionable even after the October, 1973, war, the presence of the SA-7 forced Israeli aircraft to drop bombs from a higher altitude than before, therefore increasing the inaccuracy factor. The Israelis preferred to drop their bombs from 50 to 200 feet, but the SA-7 forced them to fly considerably higher. The continued fighting, escalating rapidly with sophisticated weaponry (i.e., the Israeli acquired anti-radar missiles from the United States) was halted by a cease-fire in August, 1970, which was intended as a prelude to United States efforts toward peace.

The parties to the cease-fire stopped shooting, but the arms race went forward even more intensely. Immediately following the cease-fire, Egyptian and Soviet technicians expanded the air defense missile system of SA-2's and SA-3's to the edge of the canal.

Israel continued to purchase more aircraft from the United States; by October, 1973, Israel had about 120 Phantoms and 160 Skyhawks. Between 1967 and 1973, the Israeli air force became labeled "made in the U.S.A." instead of "made in France." The Israelis also acquired sophisticated weapons for the aircraft to carry: the Shrike anti-radar missile; the Wall-eye, television-sighted Glide bomb; the Hobos, television-sighted guided bomb; and various electronic counter-measures equipment.⁸ Israel purchased a United States-made computer system to coordinate her air defense network.

In the area of ground forces, the Israelis expanded their armored forces, including the conversion of some captured Soviet tanks, but the only source from which they could buy new tanks was the United States. They purchased 200 M-60 tanks, complete with laser range finders. When new equipment was acquired, it was almost always from the United States. The backbone of the Israeli artillery forces became the self-propelled U.S. 155mm Howitzer, 8 inch Howitzer and 175mm gun. There were extensive purchases of American armored personnel carriers. Increasingly the label "made in the U.S.A." came to fit the Israeli Defense Forces just as "made in the U.S.S.R." applied to their chief Arab opponents.

This neat pattern became complicated, on the surface at least, when Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, in July, 1972, announced the expulsion of Soviet units from Egypt. It was known that relations between the Soviet units and elements of the Egyptian military were very strained. The Soviets appear to have been overbearing and to have treated the bases under their control as if they were on Soviet rather than Egyptian soil. Sadat's move stunned the world, and it was generally believed that Egypt had thrown away her air defense and was on the verge of breaking relations with the U.S.S.R. The effectiveness of Egypt's air defense was decreased, but Soviet-Egyptian relations continued at a level of working effectiveness. Even if one disregarded the 15-year Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty concluded in May, 1971, a continuing relationship had been assured, because the Egyptians were equipped with Soviet arms. Unless Sadat was ready to replace his entire military inventory, relations with the Soviet Union would continue. The removal of the Soviet air defense forces and the Soviet Mediterranean air squadron from Egypt was

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⁶ Edward Luttwak, "The Military Balance . . . Moscow Notwithstanding," *New Middle East* (September, 1972), no. 48, pp. 15-16.

⁷ In October, 1973, the Israelis had about 50 Mirage aircraft in their first-line inventory while their other aging French aircraft were also available for use.

⁸ Ronald M. DeVore, "The Arab-Israeli Military Balance: New Perspectives," *Revue Militaire Générale* (Mars, 1973) no. 3, pp. 314-324.

Ronald M. DeVore's fields of specialization include Middle East history and military history. His writing on the Arab-Israeli arms race have appeared in the *Revue Militaire Générale* and *Military Review*. He is engaged in continuing research on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli military balance.

"... Extreme posturing by both Israelis and Palestinians indicates that the road to 'a just and lasting peace' in the Middle East, while not impossible, is long and arduous." This author points out that "the post-October war period witnessed modifications in basic ideological positions previously regarded as 'non-negotiable'..."

The Palestinians and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War

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THE LATEST SOUND of the Arab-Israeli 25-year-old war, which erupted on October 6, 1973, found the Palestinian Fedayeen movement ready for immediate participation on the operational, ideological and political planes, within the Palestinian spheres of action. Although it is not yet certain whether the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or its leader, Yasir Arafat, was privy to the timing of the on-rushing storm,¹ the fact remains that since the modest beginnings of the Palestinian resistance movement in January, 1965, under the PLO, it has persevered in accumulating revolutionary experiences.

Whether or not the events of October² took the Palestinian Fedayeen movement by surprise, the Palestinians committed their entire capacity for war and politicization to the new confrontation without hesitation. The Palestinian resistance saw the war as proof that the only beneficiary of the no-war-no-peace situation in the Middle East was Israel, and that the only response to the Zionist program in the area was war.³ Moreover, in the new military confrontation the Palestinian national movement saw the possibility of realiz-

ing some, and hopefully all, of the PLO's political program of 1968. This program called, in part, for the creation of a united, secular and democratic state of Palestine covering the entire area of mandated Palestine.

Thus ideologically, operationally, and politically, the Palestinian resistance movement, which is grouped under the umbrella of the PLO, was the least inhibited Arab party to the war of October, 1973, as far as the commitment of total Palestinian Fedayeen resources were concerned. The PLO's creation of the "third front," in relation to the two other Arab fronts (namely, the Syrian and the Egyptian fronts), came as a direct response to deeply held convictions and many years of frustration. The impact of that "third front," which has not yet been sufficiently discussed in popular or academic literature, is likely to leave a visible imprint on the future of war-making or peace-making in the Middle East.

The PLO's continuous advocacy of total and unrelenting confrontation with what it describes as "the Zionist entity," referring to Israel, gave the October war a special ideological meaning to Palestinians. In the Palestinian national movement, the absence of full and sustained warfare following the Arab defeat of 1967 was a "silence" and a "disgrace" which "helped Zionism and imperialism through their domination over our lands and natural resources."⁴ The October war, therefore, meant the production of circumstances "which were signs for the creation of the structure of a continuous and determined armed struggle in which the Arab masses would constitute the main pillar for the liquidation of the Zionist entity and the attainment of victory."⁵ "The Zionist enemy" would be purged of his "expansionist, racist and

¹ The PLO literature carries hints of this possibility, such as references to the fact that "a force belonging to Fatah reached the Egyptian front three days before the war." (Quoted from PLO literature published in Arabic in mimeograph, without a date in 1973 or a place of publication. Author's translation.)

² The Israelis prefer to call the October war "the Yom Kippur war": the Arabs call it "the Ramadan war." The religio-psychological significance of these names is that while Yom Kippur is the Jewish Day of Atonement, Ramadan is the Muslim holy month of fasting and prayer.

³ See the author's article, "Egypt and the Palestinians," in *Current History*, January, 1973.

⁴ Statement issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), in Arabic, dated October 22, 1973, under the title "No cease-fire before complete liberation of Arab soil."

⁵ *Ibid.*

treacherous nature"⁶ through popular armed struggle whose battle cry is the full restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians in their homeland. To the Palestinian national movement, that process of restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people would "only mean the establishment of a democratic society in all of Palestine."⁷

The ideological inevitability of armed struggle with Israel has been viewed by the Palestinian resistance as the result of basic contradictions between Zionism, as epitomized by Israel, and the Palestinian advocacy of "a democratic and secular Palestine state where the rights of all religious communities would be respected."⁸

As in any total confrontation, the masses are considered the primary actors. Consequently, the Palestinian revolutionaries regarded the October war as a historic opportunity for the transformation of the Arab masses from "spectators" to "participants" in the armed struggle. The "third front," namely the Palestinian resistance effort, was viewed as an undertaking which ensured the "participation of popular resistance in a modest role side by side with Arab regular armies."⁹ In historical perspective, the Palestinian national movement has not limited its belief in popular participation to the Palestinian masses; it has also advocated revolution to the masses of the entire Arab nation. This concern with mass Arab participation in the revolution against Zionism in the Middle East was reflected in statements made by Palestinian guerrilla leaders both before and during the fourth round of the Arab-Israeli war.

In an interview dated August 12, 1973, George Habash of the PFLP said:

It is true that the Arab governments are weak and they are disunited; but if you take the Arab people—the Arab people will be united around the Palestinian cause, and I am sure that in the future these governments will go, and instead of them you will find an Arab force, the force of the 100 million Arab people.¹⁰

The same conviction in the inevitable interaction between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab masses for which the October war acted as an accelerator

was voiced by Yasir Arafat. In his statement dated October 7, 1973, to the Palestinian resistance, Arafat said: "You will continue to be the Fedayeen of the nation, and we shall continue the war until victory."¹¹

END OF A MYTH

Another important facet of what the October war meant to the Palestinian resistance is the evaporation of the myth of "the invincibility of the Israeli armed forces," which was inherited from past Arab military performances. Since the Arab defeat of 1967, the Palestinians have made the destruction of the notion of Israeli military invincibility a tenet of revolutionary faith intended to encourage the other Arabs to join in an effectively broad confrontation with "the Zionist entity." In fact, the Palestinian resistance, in spite of the low level and periodicity and incidents of armed struggle against the Israelis prior to the October war, prided itself on being the first organized Arab effort aimed at destroying the image of Israeli military invincibility. The 1968 battle of Al-Karamah (meaning "dignity" in Arabic), in which the Palestinians successfully engaged the Israelis militarily east of the Jordan, is frequently cited.¹² In this connection, it should be noted that Palestinian Fedayeen actions and their resilience, despite severe blows directed at them by both Israel and Jordan (1970–1971), have contributed to the preservation of the Arab concept of the armed struggle as a viable alternative.¹³ Thus, with regard to the effects of the October war on the image of Israel's armed forces, the PFLP saw in the Arab military performance, during the fighting, important psychological and ideological gains. In its statement of October 22, 1973, the day the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 338 which called for a cease-fire, the PFLP called for the continuation of the war and said:

Within a few days of heroic combat, soldiers of our nation, on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, our heroic revolutionaries in the occupied territories and on the Arab fronts, and our masses which are devoted to sacrifice, were able to destroy the myth of "the invincible Israeli army."¹⁴

The simultaneous crossings of the Golan Heights, on the northern front, and of the Suez Canal, on the southern front, were regarded as two battles of "Al-Karamah" fought by Arab conventional armies on a much larger scale.

In addition, the intertwining of conventional Arab forces, namely, the Egyptian and Syrian armies, and Arab guerrilla forces, namely, the Palestinian resistance forces, was regarded by the PLO as a natural and important diversification. The PLO believed that there was a "special role" for the resistance in the war against Israeli occupation,¹⁵ and defined that special role in the October war in specific military terms. These were stated by Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar), in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Palestinian

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ From an interview with Abu Hatim, official spokesman of Fatah, published in *Le Monde*, October 25, 1973.

⁹ See note 1 above.

¹⁰ Interview conducted by U.P.I., August 12, 1973, in mimeograph, p. 3.

¹¹ See note 1 above.

¹² From the author's notes on an interview which he conducted with Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) of Fatah, in Beirut on July 24, 1969.

¹³ See note 4 above.

¹⁴ Defining that contribution made by the Palestinian resistance, the PLO referred to the revolution's effectiveness in "heating the area, bolstering the will to war in the Arab nation, and erecting a barrier between certain Arab regimes and surrender." See note 1 above.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

resistance forces, as follows: "More strikes at enemy's lines of communications, troop concentrations, vital installations inside the occupied territories and inside its periphery. . . ."¹⁶

In fusion between Arab guerrilla and conventional forces and the interdependence of their roles in the fields of battles in the October war reflected, for the PLO, the reality of their current military establishment, and the hope that stronger Arab military capacities would evolve. The reality related to the existence of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), a conventional force, along with the guerrilla forces of the Palestinian organizations. The October war was a welcome affirmation of the appropriateness of a Palestinian military framework. As to the hope of stronger Arab combat capabilities, the PLO saw in the participation of Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, Moroccan, Algerian, Sudanese, Kuwaiti, and Tunisian forces a phenomenon which augurs well for future Arab combat cohesiveness. Describing this as "the national identity of the battle,"¹⁷ the Palestinian resistance regarded it as essential to sensitizing the Arab masses to the primacy of military action over other actions in the Arab-Zionist Middle East confrontation. The more Arab nations are represented on the war fronts, the more comprehensive the Arab "liberational goals" will be. This is considered by the Palestinians as an important step towards the goal of creating an armed Arab mass "which would accept no alternative to liberation."¹⁸

Thus it could be said that the PLO's slogan of "Revolution until Victory" remains the main ideological term of reference for the Palestinian resistance. While the war enhanced the credibility of Palestinian revolutionary mottos and actions, it also brought to the Palestinian resistance a new sense of cohesion and unity which was later manifested at the Algiers Arab summit conference of November, 1973. Assessing the impact of the war on the Palestinians and other Arabs, an editorial by Hani Said in the newspaper *Al-Ahrrar* (of the PLO) expressed the Palestinian ideological orientation towards the war in its title: "The Battle Brings Us nearer to the Fact of Our Nation."¹⁹

The operations undertaken by "the third front" reflected the broad spectrum of Palestinian tenets. Realizing that the war, with its successful beginning favoring the Arabs, would result in important political

and geographic changes, the Palestinian resistance was anxious to prove its presence on every Arab front. Consequently, the Palestinian forces, both guerrilla and conventional, participated in the Suez, on the Golan Heights and on the southern Lebanese fronts, where for the first time since 1969 they entered villages which lie immediately across the Lebanese-Israeli armistice lines. It was on the Lebanese front that the Palestinian resistance accomplished its most significant military task, namely, the occupation of Mount Hermon at the eastern Lebanese border where it meets the Israeli armistice line.

The operation was significant because it apparently was one of the main tasks assigned by the Supreme Arab Command (Egyptian-Syrian) to the Palestinian resistance. After several hours of fighting, it resulted in a "seige and hold" undertaking which is so far uncharacteristic of the present stage of development of the Palestinian resistance. The action was designed to prevent or at least impede any Israeli effort at attacking or encircling the Syrians and their Arab allies from the eastern sector of the Lebanese border. Immediately after the successful completion of this operation, Arafat communicated the news to the Egyptian and Syrian Presidents and received a congratulatory cable from Egypt's Minister of War, Ahmed Ismail, expressing hope for "continuous cooperation for the liberation of usurped Arab territory . . ." and for "continuous receipt of news of your operations."²⁰

Furthermore, the Palestinian resistance sent groups via Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian territories into Israeli-held territories, which the resistance describes as "the internal front," to strike at supply convoys, troop concentrations, depots, radar installations, secondary airports (such as that of Al-Bassa) and settlements in the West Bank, Galilee and other areas inside Israel which the Palestinians refer to as "the 1948 occupied territory." While units of the Palestine Liberation Army were transported by helicopters to perform commando tasks ahead of the Syrian army units on the Golan front, Fatah and Al-Saika guerrilla groups crossed the Jordan River to perform diverse Fedayeen operations.²¹

From the various operations, two aspects relevant to the long-range political goals of the Palestinian resistance emerge. First, the PLO was able to improve the coordination of the guerrilla operations of its various organizations, as evidenced by the collaboration of Fatah and the Arab Liberation Front in the Mount Hermon attack cited above; second, through its active participation in the battle, the PLO was able to demonstrate that the Jordanian King was not entitled to speak for the Palestinians, especially in the light of his tokenism as a contributor to the Syrian war effort; and third, the PLO merited full legitimization to perform that role.

With this in mind, during the war the PLO tried

¹⁶ *Falastine Al-Thawrah* (main PLO newspaper, in Arabic), supplement no. 1, October 7, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁷ *Al-Ahrrar* (one of the PLO newspapers in Arabic), no. 737, October 18, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 736, October 16, 1973, p. 3. It is interesting to note that the calendar date of every issue of *Al-Ahrrar* during the war was coupled with the number of days which the war lasted. So next to the above-mentioned date was the notation, "the 12th day of battle."

²⁰ See note 16 above.

²¹ See note 1 above.

to show its interaction with the Arab population of the occupied territories by its calls for labor strikes and acts of civil disobedience. It maintained contact with other warring Arab parties by providing a continuous flow of information on Israeli military and psychological tactics.

The PLO's dual effort to enhance its cohesiveness as a military-political organization and its legitimacy as spokesman for all Palestinians was directed, in part, at influencing the post-October war period. One of its primary targets was to deprive Jordan's King Hussein of any role in a future Palestine. The Palestinian resistance found in the war its golden opportunity to isolate Hussein. The arch Hashemite enemy, who had been placed by the PLO in the same category as Israel, was to be regarded as a co-usurper with Israel of Palestinian territory, sovereignty and identity. Thus, during the war, the Palestinian resistance taunted Jordan incessantly as a government "which has strayed away from real participation."²² Describing the negative results of various pressures brought to bear upon Hussein to open "a fourth front" along 513 kilometers bordering on Israeli-held territory, the PLO put its case against the King this way:

In spite of several meetings with the representatives of the resistance and of other Arab pressures, no permission was given to the resistance forces to enter Jordan to perform operations deep in the occupied territories, and behind Israeli lines in Golan in order to threaten the enemy's logistical lines and to force Israel to freeze one whole division.²³

The unavoidable conclusion was that "Jordan was not participating"²⁴ in the new era of Arab unity and self-assertion.

In this regard, one of the main grievances of the Palestinians against Hussein's relative aloofness during the October war was that the non-activation of the Jordanian front denied the Fedayeen the opportunity to reestablish their bases in the West Bank and elsewhere and to create the kind of mass struggle which would enable the national movement to increase the levels of "internal" confrontation with Israel,²⁵ and to end its exile status as a movement of national liberation for Palestine.

THE CEASE-FIRE AND ITS AFTERMATH

Having constantly advocated "a battle of the long breath," in which the masses would reject political compromises with the "Zionist entity," the acceptance by Egypt, then by Syria, of the cease-fire on October

22 and 23 respectively was a blow to Palestinian and other Arab expectations. The Beirut Arabic weekly, *Al-Balagh*, described these severe disappointments when it said: "This should have been a war for liberation (tahreer), not for ending the political stalemate (tahreek)."²⁶ In its statement of October 22, 1973, the PFLP attacked Security Council resolution 338, which called upon "all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately,"²⁷ and appealed for a resumption of the war.

The failure of these appeals, the shift made by the PLO toward participation in the Algiers Arab summit conference, which was boycotted by both Iraq and Libya, and the reported readiness of the PLO to take part in the Geneva Peace Conference, even at a later stage, perhaps in 1974, are all indicators of the impact of the October war on the Palestinian national movement. What is emerging at present is a measure of interdependence between the Palestinian resistance as organized under the PLO and Arab policy in both war and peace. The revolution is fast becoming a government, and the governments in the Arab world—regardless of their ideological and social orientations—have become, to a certain extent, party to the Palestinian system or revolutionary thought. As a result, it could be said that Arab politics and diplomacy have become Palestinianized, with regard to keeping the options for the exercise of force open.

In return, the Palestinian resistance, as it approaches the possibility of becoming a government, was understandably keen on affirming its legitimacy as "the sole representative" of all the Palestinians. Its contest with King Hussein for that role was decided in its favor by the Arab summit conference of November 26–28, 1973.

The declaration issued by the summit meeting on November 28 took into full account the Fedayeen's role in combat. It stated that "in October, 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, as well as the Palestinian resistance supported by other Arab forces, have inflicted severe blows on the Israeli aggressors." The two "paramount and unchangeable" conditions for peace were deemed by the meeting of Arab Heads of State and Government, where Yasir Arafat represented the PLO, to be: "1. Evacuation by Israel of the occupied Arab territories, and first of all Jerusalem; 2. Reestablishment of the full national rights for the Palestinian people."²⁸

This affirmation of the PLO in the role of "the sole representative" was preceded by various Fedayeen statements regarding who spoke for and represented all of the Palestinian people. An example of these declarations could be found in a statement made by Nayif Hawatmeh of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP) to Edouard Saab of *Le Monde* as follows:

²² *Al-Ahrar*, no. 737, October 18, 1973, p. 1.

²³ *Ibid.*, no. 736, October 16, 1973, p. 4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 738, October 19, 1973, p. 1.

²⁵ *Al-Hadaf* (of PFLP), no. 224, October 20, 1973, p. 2.

²⁶ *Al-Balagh*, no. 99, November 26, 1973, in an article entitled "The Dialogue within the Resistance Movement."

²⁷ United Nations document S/RES/338 (1973), October 21, 1973.

²⁸ *The New York Times*, November 29, 1973, p. 16.

All imperialist maneuvers aimed at solving the Middle East conflict without taking into account the Palestinian people's right to self-determination are bound to fail. Only the Palestinian resistance is entitled to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people whom it represents, and to determine their future.²⁹

The same emphasis on the PLO's monopoly to speak and act on behalf of all the Palestinians in either peace or war was found in a broadcast by Radio Baghdad on October 31, 1973. In a dispatch from Beirut quoting from *Al-Muharrir* (Arabic daily) which reflected the newly found unity amongst the Palestinian resistance organizations prior to the Algiers Arab summit, the Iraqi News Agency said that "a preliminary outline has been agreed upon among all Palestinian organizations." Their unanimous view was that

the West Bank, the Gaza sector, and the Hammah area are all Palestinian territories in which Palestinians live. . . . The subject of these areas does not require any debate because these are Palestinian areas and their people can be accepted over these territories, for the Palestinians alone have the right to determine their own future.³⁰

On the international scene, the legitimacy of the PLO and the necessity of the restoration of the Palestinians' legitimate rights became inextricably intertwined in the post-October war period. While the U.S.S.R., as quoted by Palestinian sources, linked the application of Security Council resolution 242 to the "destiny of the Palestinian people,"³¹ the United States Department of State affirmed that among the "long-range United States objectives" in the Middle East is "taking into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people in the context of the settlement."³² Neither of the co-sponsors of the Geneva Conference, namely the United States and the U.S.S.R., has so far even remotely referred to the Hussein Plan of March, 1972, calling for the establishment of a federal structure between a Palestinian Province and a Jordanian Province under his rule.

The recognition of the PLO and of the legitimacy of the restoration of Palestinian national rights was also made by the United Nations General Assembly

resolution of 1973 relating to the Palestine "refugees," which "reaffirms that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."³³ Prior to adopting that resolution, the Assembly's Special Political Committee permitted the delegation of the PLO, "the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine, the principal party to the Palestine question," to be heard.³⁴ Moreover, the Assembly, in another resolution which dealt, *inter alia*, with the Palestinians' right to return to their homes and property, "reaffirms the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps," and "deplores the refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants."³⁵

Under the impact of events generated by the October war, including the energy crisis, West Europe and Japan took pro-United Nations, pro-Arab stands, while African nations, with the exception of South Africa, Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland, severed all relations with Israel, in response to O.A.U. (Organization of African Unity) calls.³⁶

DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD

To what extent could the Palestinians and Israelis, through their participation in the Geneva Peace Conference, reach an agreement to coexist in the same territory of mandated Palestine as two sovereign and independent entities? Is such an accommodation feasible when Israel publicly refuses to envisage the possibility of a State of Palestine, and the PLO declares that it will never negotiate with Israel? At present, Israeli Premier Golda Meir refers to Arafat by saying "He doesn't represent a country. . . . I don't know how you negotiate with somebody who tells you that you are doomed to die."³⁷ Such extreme posturing by both Israelis and Palestinians indicates that the road to "a just and lasting peace" in the Middle East, while not impossible, is long and arduous. Questions about the possibility of Israel-Palestine coexistence were remote prior to the October war. Can they be resolved without other conflagrations? The answers lie in the future, although it is clear that the post-October war period witnessed modifications in basic ideological positions previously regarded as "non-negotiable" by the two primary parties to the conflict, namely, the original communities of mandated Palestine—the Arabs and the Jews.

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²⁹ *Le Monde*, October 25, 1973.

³⁰ Iraqi News Agency, 0827 GMT, October 31, 1973, in Arabic.

³¹ *Al-Balagh*, no. 99, October 26, 1973, see note 26 above.

³² U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Policy Outlines*, November, 1973, p. 2.

³³ United Nations General Assembly resolutions, 28th session, agenda item 43.

³⁴ This was requested by more than 70 delegations who referred to the resolution adopted by the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned-Countries meeting in Algiers in September, 1973. The PLO delegation consisted of Saadat Hassan and Ibrahim Ebeid.

³⁵ United Nations General Assembly resolutions, 28th session, agenda item 43.

³⁶ *Révolution Africaine*, no. 509, November 23-29, 1973, p. 14.

³⁷ *Time*, December 10, 1973, p. 55.

"... The underlying determinants in the present crisis are and remain economic; ... the Middle East oil producers are aligned for the purpose of obtaining the highest price for their product in view of the energy crisis and the indispensability of their oil in the economic and industrial life of the Western countries."

Middle East Oil

BY BENJAMIN SHWADRAN

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THE RAPID DEVELOPMENTS in the Middle East oil industry in the last five or six years have been dizzying.* Even as late as 1968 the concessionaire companies maintained a strong oil price structure; they have controlled the world oil markets; they reaped fabulous profits; the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) put in an eight-year effort and failed to restore price cuts which the companies instituted in 1960 and 1961. The companies held on steadfastly to the 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement, and they refused the oil-producing governments' requests even for a small percentage participation in company ownership. The companies were dominant and powerful over the producing countries.

Since 1970, the process has been completely reversed. Price cuts were restored and soared upward constantly and rapidly; allowances of different sorts were eliminated; the governments' percentage profits were raised to 55 percent and royalties were expanded. The companies agreed to grant the governments 25-percent ownership participation which was to be increased to 51 percent by January 1, 1982. Later, demands were made for immediate 51-percent or even 100-percent ownership. Prices rose through mutual agreements, and early in October, 1973, prices were hiked by some 70 percent unilaterally by the producing countries. The major Middle East Arab producing countries instituted an embargo on oil exports to the United States, and with lesser severity to other parts of the world. The producing countries have become dominant and powerful over the companies.

The explanation for this almost unique development

must be sought in the long struggle between the producing countries and the concessionaire companies and the prevailing conditions in the various periods of the struggle.

Even before, but especially since World War II, the oil-producing countries realized the economic importance of their natural resource and struggled with the companies to obtain better and larger returns from the oil. The companies steadily and systematically resisted, although from time to time they would make some, on the whole, minor concessions. The companies had all the assets necessary for the operation, growth, and control of the industry—they had the technical know-how, they had the necessary huge investments for the operation and growth of the complex industry, they controlled all the downstream operations, and they had the international markets for the oil produced. They also had the means of manipulating world production.

While producing countries were desperately in need of the revenue produced from the oil the companies could always replace Middle East production from other sources, primarily from the United States. Moreover, as the world petroleum markets always suffered from oversupplies, threatened curtailed production by the governments would have had little effect.

Although the pattern of the new international politics gave the developing nations new status and new importance, and the companies had to take this into consideration in their dealings with oil-producing countries, the basic economic factors involved maintained the companies in their well-entrenched positions.

Beginning with the late 1960's and burgeoning out in the early 1970's, the basic conditions began to change. Demand for oil rose sharply over supplies; the thirst of the industrialized world for ever greater quantities of petroleum could not be slaked. The oil reserves and oil production in the United States began to dwindle very rapidly. On the other hand, some of

* The author completed the third revised and enlarged edition of his book *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* last April, which was published by Wiley & Sons in New York, and Israel Universities Press in Jerusalem, and released on January 2, 1974. This article is an attempt to analyze Middle East oil developments since April.

the producing countries penetrated, even though on a limited basis at first, the technology of the industry and began to produce, refine, transport, and even market some of their oil. But what was perhaps most decisive: because of enormous production quantities, they earned fantastically huge amounts of revenue, and they were no longer in need of additional income. Indeed, some of them had more money than they knew what to do with. To this must be added the impact of the world inflationary pressures and the instability of the international financial and currency structure.

Thus while in earlier years all the factors caused the producing countries to demand ever greater increases in production, all the factors today lead the producing countries to decrease seriously production. It is now clearly understood by all concerned that the oil in the ground will bring much greater returns later than oil produced now. The prices are bound to go up while the value of money is bound to go down.

Today, the international Middle East oil crisis, which is solidly rooted in economic determinants, has assumed a political aspect. The most outstanding Arab oil-producing countries' spokesmen, ignoring the global superpower struggle and all the international economic and financial aspects, tell us that the world energy crisis is a purely political issue, and they reduce it to simplistic terms: The world energy shortage is caused by Israel. All the world has to do is force Israel to comply with Arab requests and it will get all the oil it wants. The supposed threatened disaster which faces the United States, Europe, and Japan could be easily and simply avoided, and the prosperity and well-being of all would continue and blossom, if only Israel would comply.

What these Arab spokesmen are trying to say is that their determination to refuse oil to the West and Japan is a pure Arab loyalty move. It is devoid of economic consideration, and only political pressure on Israel to rectify the injustice to the Arab cause would satisfy them. The consumers would then be permitted to obtain as much oil as they need on practically the same terms as before.¹

The history of the Arab national-unity movement and the role of oil in it in the last 25 years, refute these proclamations and implied promises. The Arab cause did not come into being in 1973, it goes back to 1948. Ever since, the Arab League has attempted, either on an *ad hoc* basis or through the organization of the Arab Petroleum Congress in 1959, to employ oil in the Arab political battle. The major oil pro-

ducers, who are the present embargo leaders, namely Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, consistently and persistently refused to permit their oil to become a football in the hands of Arab politicians. They would not allow the non-oil-producing members of the Arab League to use their oil, freely and irresponsibly. In fact the original purpose of the formation of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), organized by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya early in 1968 after the Arab-Israeli 1967 war, was to prevent the other Arab countries, especially Egypt, from interfering with the economic interests of the oil producers.

It is, therefore, submitted that the underlying determinants in the present crisis are and remain economic; that the Middle East oil producers are aligned for the purpose of obtaining the highest price for their product in view of the energy crisis and the indispensability of their oil in the economic and industrial life of the Western countries. The political stance is being utilized both to reinforce the real economic factors and to rally to the side of the producers the loyalty and following of the Arab masses. It is possible that King Faisal of Saudi Arabia has seized the great opportunity—now that the economic and political objectives coincide—of pressing the Arab cause on the United States through his oil and thus claiming overall Arab leadership. Paradoxically, King Faisal the arch conservative has become the radical front runner in the battle against the Western countries.

The real factors in this energy crisis must be recognized and identified and the solutions must aim at them, and not at the political blind.

THE CHALLENGE

The Middle Eastern oil-producing countries have seriously and dangerously challenged the economic system of the West and Japan. Before searching for possible countermoves, the nature and proportions of the challenge should be examined.

The oil-producing countries are divided into three categories, and these categories determine their positions. 1) The first group consists of countries or principalities of the Persian Gulf which depend heavily or exclusively on their oil income. They are either just on the threshold of oil development or are small and limited producers. They are ready to sell their oil according to their agreed contracts and concessions without imposing special conditions. 2) The second group consists of countries which have large populations, massive development projects, and are great oil producers; included in this category are Iran, Iraq, and Algeria. They need the oil revenue to finance their current budgets and their economic development programs. They are ready to sell all the oil the consumers can purchase provided

¹ It is interesting to note that the decision taken by the Arab oil-producing countries on October 17, 1973, in Kuwait, to institute the embargo said they had decided: "To discontinue the economic sacrifices they had made in producing quantities of their wasting oil assets in excess of what would be justified by domestic considerations."

the price is high, and if possible very high. 3) The third group consists of countries with small populations, gigantic oil resources and production records, and financial satiation. To this category belong Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi. They are determined to curtail substantially or even to stop completely the flow of oil to the industrialized nations.

This would drive the price of oil very high; the producers would be in a position to dole out oil to whomever they choose in whatever quantity they choose and at their own discretion. Because of the very low economic development stage of these countries, the principle of mutual interdependence does not operate, for they hardly need the products which the consuming countries could offer them in return for the oil purchase. They could, therefore, dictate at will the amount of oil to be produced and to whom sold, and they could also very effectively utilize their monetary resources to manipulate international economics, politics, and finances. For they have accumulated astronomical balances of cash in their treasuries and in deposits in banks abroad.

West Europe and Japan reacted differently to this challenge than did the United States; and this difference stems from their respective experiences, as well as the nature of the challenge. West Europe and Japan were never independent as far as their energy sources were concerned; they always had to import them, and somehow managed to get along. Moreover, West Europe, especially Great Britain and France, were resentful of the United States for having such huge petroleum resources at home, and for having obtained great concessions abroad, particularly in the Middle East, and thus dominating the energy resources of the world. The European powers were, therefore, willing to submit to Arab demands with the hopes of negotiating with the Middle Eastern countries without American interference. The past, however, should have been no guide to either Europe or Japan, for in the past there was always the alternative which regulated the industry—the United States. Should the United States also submit, the Middle East would have absolute power over all three.

It appears that the United States is determined to accept the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries' challenge and achieve independence in the supply of energy. It is inconceivable that a country of the magnitude of the United States with global strategic

stakes and international position would permit itself to become dependent for its energy supplies, both in times of peace and in times of war, on the uncertainties of the Middle East supplies.

Alternatives to Middle East oil will have to be found; and the United States has the determination and ability to find them. Some answers lie in the problem itself. There are always available alternatives to Middle East oil, but they are not developed commercially because of pure economic considerations. Middle East oil is produced so cheaply that it is senseless to develop alternatives which would be much more expensive.

Should Middle East oil become very expensive, as it actually has—there was a 70 percent increase in posted prices early in October, and Iran received oil purchasing tenders for triple the previous price, in December²—the development of the previously expensive alternatives might become very attractive. Here is a list of possible alternatives: 1) coal energy, 2) production of gasoline and its derivatives from coal, 3) manufacture of petroleum and petroleum products from the huge shale deposits in the United States, 4) utilization of the tar sands in Canada, 5) development of all forms of atomic energy, 6) hydroelectric power, 7) solar energy, 8) geothermic power, 9) greater efforts in discovery and production of petroleum and natural gas resources on-shore and off the shores of the United States and other friendly countries.

That all these have certain drawbacks and shortcomings, some very serious, as compared with Middle East oil production, goes without saying, but there would seem to be no choice. That the United States will mobilize all its resources to find alternatives to Middle East oil is almost a certainty. And when it does it will not only assure its own needs, but also stabilize and normalize Middle East production and prices, and thus assure steady supplies to Europe and Japan.

The problem which is facing all three—Europe, Japan, and the United States—is how to overcome the difficulties of supply shortages between now and the target date set for achieving energy independence. The target set by United States President Richard Nixon—1980—is generally accepted as feasible, but the forecasts of some of the economists of what may happen until then are real doom. Some intimate that by the time energy independence is achieved there will be no need for supplies.

The development of alternatives was long overdue; the energy crisis had been forecast for many years. Many farsighted engineers and economists warned about it, but no action was taken by the proper authorities. The United States government was perhaps lulled into inaction and false security by the international oil companies³ and by its own ideological unwillingness to interfere with private

² At an OPEC meeting in Vienna late in November, which considered company proposals for price fixing, Iranian Finance Minister Jamshid Amouzegar stated: "If we were unreasonable we would increase our oil prices by 200 percent."

³ Even as late as last August, some of the major American international oil companies (Standard of California, Mobile Oil Corporation) undertook a public campaign to influence American Middle East policy to concede to Arab demands. They thus hoped to save their position with the Middle East producers.

enterprise or to institute regimentation. The government failed the American people by not warning them of the coming crisis and of the great effort that would be necessary—through sacrifices and self-denial—to develop other energy sources. If the American public had been told the full impact and gravity of the crisis, it would have exerted all its energies and would have prevented the danger to the American and world economy.

The story of Middle East oil is the best illustration of the neglect and sacrifice of the consumer for the benefit of great corporate profits. Middle East oil, perhaps oil throughout the world, was never allowed to evolve economic prices through free and open competition. The international companies maintained artificially high prices. Even though the manufacture of Middle East oil was cheap the beneficiaries were neither the producing countries who received very low payments nor the consumers who paid highly inflated prices. The real gainers were the companies. Now the prices are again inflated, and the gainers are the producers, next to them the companies, and lastly the consumers, who still pay very high, and will continue to pay even higher, non-competitive prices.

In spite of the constant deterioration of the position of the companies during the last seven years they did not alert the American government to the situation and permitted the crisis to reach its present proportions. Should the United States succeed in developing alternatives to Middle East oil, the latter would become competitive and consumers would come into their own.

THE SOVIET POSITION

The Soviet Union has kept exceptionally quiet about the present energy crisis. The facts about the Soviet energy resources are not sufficiently established to make it possible to analyze the situation. One can only speculate. There can be no doubt that the conflict between the Middle East oil-producing countries and the United States and West Europe and Japan serves well the long-range political global interests of the Soviet Union. But the practical immediate objectives, if any, are not clear at all. It is possible that in spite of the Soviet Union's boast of increased reserves and increased production, it is experiencing shortages of energy supplies, and is, therefore, interested in acquiring Middle East oil for itself and for its satellites; the present conflict would therefore serve its purpose.

If this is the case, if the Soviet Union eyes the Middle East oil for its own needs, it could not have picked a worse time. The inflated prices of oil which were brought about by the Arab embargo will hardly make it possible for the Soviet Union to pay for the oil. All the oil and natural gas which the Soviet Union and the other members of the Commu-

nist bloc have purchased in the past from the Middle Eastern producers, and they were a very tiny part of the total, were arranged on a barter basis. The producing countries are looking for cash customers, and the Communist bloc countries could not pay with cash before, let alone at the new highly inflated prices.

Nor is it conceivable, at this stage of world developments, that the Soviet Union will take over the Middle East oil fields by military force. Moreover, the Soviet Union is trying to obtain American investments and technology in developing its energy resources in Siberia on a mutual benefit basis; occupation of the Middle East oil fields would decidedly not advance that effort.

On the other hand, it was reported that the Soviet Union approached some threatened European countries offering to supply their necessary oil needs. Some reports even mentioned Holland by name. These reports must be dismissed as manufactured. Such a move, no matter how desperate the Soviet Union might be for hard currency, would defeat its major effort to penetrate and dominate the Middle East, and would serve no other positive purpose anywhere else.

It would seem that the Soviet Union is following its old policy of creating and increasing tension between the Middle East and the United States and between the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, and ultimately causing conflict within the Middle East itself. Of course, from this point of view, the energy crisis as it is shaping up could not better serve the Communist cause.

For the United States, a real countermove would be the development of alternatives to Middle East oil. The Middle East oil would still be important and serve energy needs in Asia and Europe, and stimulate the economic growth of the oil-producing countries, but its strategic importance and the strategic importance of the Middle East itself would be greatly reduced if not completely eliminated. Under such conditions, Middle East oil would regain its basic economic value; the role of the Soviet Union in the region would be greatly toned down; and peace would come to that part of the world.

Benjamin Shwadran, formerly director of the Middle East Institute at Dropsie College in Philadelphia, is the editor of the Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, the editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs*, and author of many books including *Jordan: A State of Tension* (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), *The Power Struggle in Iraq* (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960), and *General Index Middle Eastern Affairs* (Elmont, N.Y.: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1968). In 1968–1969, he served as Research Professor in Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University in Israel.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

REVOLUTIONS AND MILITARY RULE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: EGYPT, THE SUDAN, YEMEN, AND LIBYA. BY GEORGE M. HADDAD. (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1973. 458 pages, appendix, selected bibliography, and index, \$12.50.)

George Haddad, professor of history at the University of California at Santa Barbara, presents a detailed and valuable account of the 20 revolutions and coups d'état between 1948 and 1969 in Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen, and Libya. He does not mince words in deploring the "tragic and destructive aspects of the radical military and of the socialist revolution that it imposed" in these countries.

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MIDDLE EAST RECORD, Vol. 4: 1968. EDITED BY DANIEL DISHON. (New York and Jerusalem: Halstead Press of John Wiley & Sons, and Israel Universities Press, 1973. 889 pages, index, \$55.00.)

This is an expertly written and analyzed compendium of original essays on domestic and foreign policy developments in the Middle East in 1968. Divided into four parts, it treats the activities of the Great Powers in the area; relations between the countries of the region; the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the internal developments of each country. The essays are thorough, informative, and dispassionately presented. The price tag is high, but the data contained in the volume make it indispensable for any research-oriented institution or reference service.

A.Z.R.

THE COMING CRISIS IN ISRAEL: PRIVATE FAITH AND PUBLIC POLICY. BY NORMAN L. ZUCKER with the assistance of NAOMI FLINK ZUCKER (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973. 282 pages, glossary, works cited, index, \$10.00.)

No understanding of Israeli politics is possible without serious attention to the centrality of the religion-state conflict. The author traces the efforts of the religious parties to establish a Torah state through legislation. The conflicts over the constitution, the reform and conservative branches of Judaism, marriage and divorce, education, the military, and the definition of a Jew are treated. This is an

original and welcome contribution to the general theme of religion in politics.

A.Z.R.

ARAB CONTEMPORARIES: THE ROLE OF PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS. BY MAJID KHADDURI. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 255 pages, appendix and index, \$8.95.)

The distinguished scholar, Professor Majid Khadduri, offers personality profiles of a dozen leading Arabs of the twentieth century. He groups his personalities into three categories: the military politician, which includes Nuri Al-Sa'id and Jamal 'Abd Al-Nasir; the professional politician, such as Habib Bourguiba and Khalid Bakdash; and the intellectual politician, such as Michel Aflaq.

He observes that while Arabs "yearn for strong political leaders," they will increasingly require that the new leaders have "qualities that will insure the stability and survival of the evolving system—the qualities of flexibility, temperance, and a sense of practicability."

A.Z.R.

MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS. BY DAVID BEN-GURION. (New York: The Third Press, 1973. 342 pages, \$10.00.)

Most of the material in this book is a translation from Hebrew of David Ben-Gurion's recollections of attempts to reach an amicable understanding with Arab leaders. The focus is on the period from 1933 to 1939, though the 1956 period also figures in this account. What does emerge is a sense of the inherent irreconcilability of the Arab and Jewish positions in the 1930's on the key issues of immigration, land tenure, and political rule, and of the unwillingness of Arab leaders to accept the principle of a truly equal relationship.

A.Z.R.

EDUCATION AND MODERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BY JOSEPH S. SZYLLOWICZ. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973. 477 pages, appendix tables and index, \$19.50.)

The contemporary origins, evolution, and endemic difficulties of the educational systems in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran are analyzed in this study.

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ISRAEL BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE

(Continued from page 52)

since the fighting took place not in the territory of pre-1967 Israel but rather in the occupied areas far from the main centers of Israeli population and habitation.

The Egyptians and Syrians stated that the major factor in their decision to launch the October war was that Israel continued to hold substantial segments of their territory which had been occupied since the June war. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967)¹⁶ which generally had been accepted as the basis for a settlement had called for withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories and the right of each state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The question of withdrawal and the need to negotiate secure and recognized borders was thus the central focus of the efforts at a settlement between the 1967 and 1973¹⁷ wars and emerged as a major focus of the post-1973 war discussions. The reconciliation of the Arab demand for Israeli withdrawal and the Israeli insistence on a secure existence remained the major problem in the postwar discussions. Within Israel there were signs of some compromise and while Israel continued to argue for secure and recognized borders and insisted there would be no return to the lines which existed prior to the 1967 war, there was increasing evidence of a flexibility on territorial questions. In the revised electoral platform of the Labor party as well as in public discussion there seemed to be a growing trend toward opposing annexation of Arab territory.¹⁸

TOWARD PEACE?

To many observers the 1973 war facilitated the chances for peace and some noted that the prospects for peace were greater than at any other time in the preceding 25-year history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The cease-fire resolution proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union and adopted by the United Nations Security Council not only called for a cease-fire but also for the implementation of Resolution 242 of 1967 and declared "that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate aus-

¹⁶ The reference to Resolution 242 in the 1973 cease-fire resolution conjured up memories of the problems with implementing that resolution between the 1967 and 1973 wars. In part the 1973 war may be regarded as a partial result of the Arab frustration with the nonimplementation of resolution 242 as they interpreted it. Israel has interpreted that resolution differently.

¹⁷ See Bernard Reich, "The Jarring Mission and the Search for Peace in the Middle East," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, vol. 26, pp. 13-20 (1972).

¹⁸ See, for example, *The New York Times*, November 29, 1973.

pices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." Although the cease-fire broke down, it was subsequently "stabilized" and discussions between Israeli and Egyptian military officers at Kilometer 101 provided the background for negotiations on the broader questions of a settlement. Israel faces those negotiations with continuing emphasis on the imperatives of security although there seemed to be increasing internal debate on the precise components of this need. Israel's weakened international posture and her heavy dependence on the United States provide important limits to Israel's negotiating position.

The central question facing Israel at the beginning of her second quarter century of independence was whether the Yom Kippur War would have the effect of contributing toward settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Clearly, however, as Israel moved toward the negotiating table she also sought to maintain internal political cohesiveness and the security posture and military strength essential to ensure security in the absence of peace.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 83)

The author notes that seldom did any of the three governments "evidence a commitment to educational transformation" or grapple with the basic problems of upgrading teacher qualifications, modernizing curricula, and raising educational standards. He is not optimistic about the future of their educational systems. A.Z.R.

THERE COULD HAVE BEEN PEACE. BY JON KIMCHE. (New York: The Dial Press, 1973. 360 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$8.95.)

A veteran British correspondent focuses on two periods when he believes peace in the Middle East was possible: the 1917-1922 period; and the 1967-1970 period. Basing his analysis on the private papers of key officials and extensive interviewing, he sheds new light on the role of the Great Powers and the centrality of domestic politics in limiting Israel's flexibility. The glimpses into Israel's arcane domestic political in-fighting are worth the price of the book. A.Z.R.

THE FACE OF DEFEAT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND GUERRILLAS. BY DAVID PRYCE-JONES. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. 179 pages, index, \$5.95.)

A British journalist offers some colorful vignettes of the Palestinian refugees and guerrillas since the 1967 war. Most of the facts are well known, and developed more fully elsewhere. However, the author does convey the sense of drama and tragedy inherent in the situation. A.Z.R.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE

(Continued from page 73)

not a total disaster for the Soviets because their troops were removed from an area where they might have become involved in local hostilities. Soviet technical advisers and supply personnel remained in Egypt.

THE SOVIET ROLE

The acquisition of a weapons system carries with it the requirement that the recipient maintain contact with the supplier, in order to obtain spare parts, remain abreast of recent modifications, and receive aid when necessary in maintaining the equipment.⁹ It is not uncommon in a three-year contract for purchasing fighter aircraft for the cost of spare parts to equal the cost of the initial piece of equipment. This requirement dictates a continuing relationship between the recipient and the supplier. Israel has made extensive efforts to cut this umbilical-cord relationship but the events of October, 1973, demonstrate that such freedom for Israel is far in the future. Although several thousand Soviets serving as advisers, technicians, and in combat units were swiftly removed from Egypt in 1972, Soviet equipment in Egyptian hands continued to provide a basis for an ongoing relationship.

Thus, the Egyptians needed the Soviets for parts and advice, while the Soviets were concerned with the way their weapons would be used and would affect their international image.

The Soviet image as international weapons-maker and tactical adviser recovered somewhat from the debacle of 1967. But in December, 1972, it suffered a new blow when the United States used B-52 bombers to attack targets in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had two Soviet weapons designed specifically to stop the B-52—the MIG-2 aircraft and the SA-2 Guideline missile. They failed. Some B-52's were lost but as an overall percentage of the B-52 effort, these losses were minor.

Egyptian-Soviet relations improved in late 1972, and from then until the October, 1973, war, the Soviet Union supplied Egypt and Syria with some of the most advanced weapons in its inventory. These included the SA-6 Gainful mobile anti-aircraft missile, which proved very effective against Israeli aircraft, the AT-3 Sagger, a third-generation wire-guided anti-tank missile, as well as anti-tank weapons for individual foot soldiers. The Soviet willingness to commit a weapon so technologically advanced as the SA-6

and one which had never before been exposed to combat and possible capture is a clear indication of the high degree of Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli arms race. The weapons supplied to the Arabs were limited to the conventional sphere, but were tailored to the capacity of the Arab forces effectively to employ them. The Soviets avoided introducing major strategic systems which the Arabs had wanted, with the exception of the SCUD surface-to-surface rocket which appeared in Egypt immediately before the war. The SCUD gave the Egyptians the capability of launching a rocket which could hit Israel but lacking the accuracy for pinpoint target destruction. Supplied with a high explosive warhead, it may have provided the Egyptians with a psychological boost, while not seriously altering the strategic balance.

CONCLUSION

The Arab decision to initiate hostilities in October, 1973, was rooted in the frustrations of the six years of diplomatic stalemate after June, 1967, and was not based on any illusion that the Arabs could decisively defeat the massive Israeli military machine. Egyptian and Syrian forces advanced with equipment made in the U.S.S.R. and were met by the Israeli Defense Forces, whose equipment now was generally made in the United States. The initial Arab gains were surprising, and the violent Israeli counterthrusts were expected. The October war may have set a new record for the rapid expenditure of ammunition and equipment. The limited logistics systems of both sides have traditionally been considered crucial factors defining the length of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

But in October, 1973, both sides rapidly fell back on their superpower suppliers, not only for items such as ammunition, but also for major pieces of equipment including tanks and aircraft. The Soviet Union began its airlift of supplies during the first week of the war, and during the second week the United States began a massive airlift to Israel. Were these supply efforts a simple reaction to the needs of the combatants or was the surrogate relationship coming into play?

Clearly, the Soviet Union could not allow Soviet weapons to be defeated by American arms, and the United States could not permit Russian weapons to defeat United States equipment. The superpower entanglement in the Arab-Israeli arms race eventually alerted the military forces of both superpowers when it appeared to the United States that the Soviet Union would intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory over the Egyptian army. Following the cease-fire of October, 1973, both sides have been re-equipped by their sponsors. There is no end in sight for the Arab-Israeli arms race, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the suppliers from their surrogates.

⁹ Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts," *International Conciliation* (March, 1970), no. 577.

LIBYA

(Continued from page 61)

riches and opportunities of Libya, the more sophisticated Egyptians clearly feared the introduction of a fundamentalist Islamic regime and the upsetting of Egypt's highly hierarchical structure by Libyan-type popular committees.

Consequently, when it came to final negotiations for union in late July and August, Sadat knew that he had the substantial support of his people in resisting Qaddafi's terms for a full and immediate merger. Ultimately, an agreement of a compromise nature was signed on August 29, 1973. Egypt and Libya pledged to establish a union by gradual stages. The first step was to confirm the already established Unified Political Command (or Leadership) composed of the President of Egypt and the Chairman of the RCC of Libya. Second, it was decided to form a constitutional commission to be composed of 50 members of the Egyptian National Assembly and 50 members "to be chosen among the people's committees" by decision of the Libyan RCC. The tasks of the commission would be (a) to draw up the constitution for the union, (b) to nominate a candidate for the presidency. Subsequently, a popular referendum in both states was to be held to approve the constitution and elect the President. In addition, the agreement provided for a common currency (the Arab dinar), a free economic zone on both sides of the border, and—as interim measures—an exchange of resident ministers in Tripoli and Cairo, and the creation of a supreme planning council as well as a technical secretariat to assist it.

QADDAFI'S AMBITION

It was generally expected—with Colonel Qaddafi publicly on record in this respect—that President Sadat would be elected President of the new united state. It was less certain what position Colonel Qaddafi would assume. In a surprisingly candid statement quoted by *Time* on April 2, 1973, Qaddafi was reported as saying to his interviewer: "Egypt is a country without a leader. I am a leader without a country."¹² If this quotation is correct, it would confirm Qaddafi's well-known ambition to emerge as a Pan-Arab leader who would seek in Egypt a broader and more central base for his activities than that afforded by his native Libya. There was much speculation in the Middle East about Qaddafi's desire to become commander-in-chief of the united army and thus gain power through his control of the coercive apparatus of the new state. One might wonder

whether President Sadat would agree to such a solution. Other alternatives for Qaddafi might include the vice presidency of the union with residence in Cairo, the position of chief executive (with an appropriate title) of the Libyan province, or resignation and early retirement into obscurity.

The first of these would carry with it merely nominal functions with gradual loss of influence in the more sophisticated environment of Cairo. The second might leave the Colonel much real power but, obviously, at the expense of the true unification of both states. Finally, the third—retirement—though unlikely for an energetic 32-year-old officer, was theoretically conceivable as an act of personal sacrifice by an idealistic leader for the sake of Arab unity. These speculations were based on the assumption that union would indeed be consummated as planned—which was not absolutely certain in the whirlpool of Arab politics in the 1970's.

THE UNCERTAIN KINGDOM
OF JORDAN*(Continued from page 65)*

process of reconciliation between Jerusalem Arabs and Jews has been slow and occasionally painful.²²

Perhaps in response to Hussein's frustrations with Israel, Jordan's relations with Egypt and Syria improved markedly in 1973. During Arab Defense Council meetings in Cairo in late January, 1973, Jordan agreed to place her army under nominal Egyptian command. At a conference of "frontline" states in Cairo from September 10 to 12, 1973, Egyptian-Jordanian diplomatic relations were restored. Jordan agreed in principle to reactivate the eastern front with Syria and to coordinate military strategy with Egypt. In addition, King Hussein agreed to shelve his Arab kingdom plan and to release Palestinian guerrillas from Jordanian jails.

These developments set the stage for Jordanian intervention on the Syrian front on October 13, 1973, one week after the war had started. About 5,000 troops were committed and placed under Syrian command. Jordan's participation was mainly symbolic, however, meant to appease critics at home and abroad, and casualties were light. Jordan immediately accepted the United Nations cease-fire resolution, reaffirming her belief in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, as a basis for a settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. The war may have granted Hussein a reprieve on the domestic and diplomatic fronts by persuading his fellow Arabs that

¹² "The Arab World: Oil, Power, Violence," *Time*, April 2, 1973, p. 26. According to *Time's* publisher, the Libyan part of this collectively written larger article was contributed by the Nairobi Bureau Chief, Lee Griggs.

²² See article by Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, "Undivided but Still Diverse: the Mosaic that Is Jerusalem," *New Middle East*, no. 52/53, January-February, 1973, pp. 12-15.

he is working for their interests. Nonetheless, the critical relationship with the Palestinians has yet to be resolved, and an acceptable accommodation with Israel appears to be distant.

JORDAN'S FUTURE: HOPE AND UNCERTAINTY

Jordan's immediate future will be determined by the government's ability to placate the Palestinians, by the success of economic and social planning, and by the outcome of negotiations with Israel after the October, 1973, war. Although the Palestinians have been quiescent for several years, their hopes, fears, and aspirations must be dealt with by Jordan, within whose borders the majority of them live, as well as by Israel and the world community. Although it claims to speak on behalf of the Palestinians, the Hashemite kingdom is not likely voluntarily to transform itself into a Palestinian state, as some Israeli spokesmen and others have suggested. Yet Hussein's Arab kingdom plan, were it resurrected, offers some hope that Palestinians could achieve a partial self-determination within Jordan that in time could lead to greater national autonomy and individual fulfillment. Moreover, it might reduce Jordan's immense refugee burden by encouraging Palestinian responsibility for their own fate. In any case, Hussein's efforts at long-range nation-building could be severely restricted, and the future of his dynasty placed in doubt, if some accommodation with the Palestinians is not reached.

Thus, Jordan's economic and political initiatives are singularly dependent on forces beyond her control. Her legitimacy as an independent Arab state is not recognized by many Arabs. Her economy and the welfare of her people are subject in large measure to the good will of other states, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia. Acting alone, Jordan can neither recover her occupied territories by force, nor ensure a sympathetic hearing of her diplomatic claims by the world community. Yet the maintenance of the status quo with Israel for an indefinite period would appear to be morally unacceptable to Jordanian leaders, and politically difficult, if not impossible, to continue, particularly if the Egyptians are able to recover at least some of their occupied lands.

With a measure of luck, however, the outlook for Jordan is not unpromising. Her people are inured to poverty, hardship, and hard work. A limited prosperity for many, if not affluence, is probably achievable and, with cooperation from outside powers, dignity for the refugees and displaced persons is certainly in order. Compared with many, Jordan's government operates creditably enough; an unanswered question is whether the Jordanian leadership has the capacity to proceed wisely in the months of turbulence and change following the fourth round of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

IRAN TODAY

(Continued from page 69)

plans GNP increased threefold and annual per capita income rose from \$197 in 1962 to \$513 in 1973. The annual growth rate during the last plan between 1966 and 1973 was an impressive 12.9 percent.

The main goals of the new plan were declared to be: rapid economic growth, equitable distribution of national income, better socio-economic balance between rural and urban areas, administrative reform and stronger national defense, and expanded industrial output and international trade. The overall target was an annual rise in GNP of approximately 11.4 percent.¹²

Although some of these goals may appear overly ambitious and unrealistic, their partial attainment is not beyond the reach of the country. Indeed, accelerated demand for Iranian oil may increase the projected revenue for the next five years. If this amount were devoted fully to developmental projects, the impressive growth rate of the last decade might be sustained.

IRAN INSULATED

As this brief survey shows, in a year in which nearly every Middle Eastern country experienced domestic or international turmoil, Iran somehow insulated herself. Having achieved a fundamental understanding with the superpowers on the desirability of maintaining her status quo, Iran has steadily asserted her major role in the Persian Gulf. She has done so by convincing extra-regional powers like the United States, the Soviet Union, and China that their political and economic interests necessitate the Iranian assumption of the "sole guardian" role.¹³

Whether or not all regional states acquiesce in this claim or detect a basically expansionist tendency in Iranian policy remains to be seen. However, for the foreseeable future, the preoccupation of the Arab states with Israel and the weakness of the southern littoral states of the gulf may combine to enhance Iran's position. This, in turn, will enable the government of the Shah to proceed with the economic development and rapid modernization so necessary to the security of the regime and the increasingly availability of oil revenues.

¹² Government of Iran, Plan Organization: *The Fourth National Development Plan*, Teheran, 1968, pp. 117-130. For an overall appraisal of Iran's economic development, consult Julian Bharier, *Economic Development of Iran, 1900-1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

¹³ For a comprehensive analysis of these points see Sepehr Zabih's forthcoming volume co-authored with Shahram Chubin, *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Small State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974).

EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY

(Continued from page 56)

conflagration that threatened to consume their budding détente. A further outbreak of fighting, during which Israeli forces improved their position on the west bank of the Suez Canal, was brought under control, and an uneasy truce was arranged on October 25. A six-point cease-fire agreement negotiated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was signed by Egyptian and Israeli military representatives on November 11, 1973, under U.N. auspices. While important details need to be settled and the agreement's implementation in good faith still has to be demonstrated, the occasion marked the first time in the 24 years since the 1949 armistice agreement that high officials of Egypt and Israel met to discuss issues having broad political implications.

At this writing, it appears that President Sadat has emerged from the fighting with tangible and potentially significant political achievements. First, he has returned the Middle East problem to the center of the international stage and forced the two superpowers to work together to find a settlement satisfactory to the Arabs. In particular, he has enlisted the active participation of the United States, with its explicit commitment to seek a solution, "no longer," according to one Egyptian, "as the silent partner of Israel but as an active catalyst for future negotiation."¹ Proceeding on this assumption, Sadat agreed, on November 7, 1973, to resume diplomatic relations with the United States at the ambassadorial level, for the first time since Egypt severed relations on June 6, 1967.

Second, Sadat's alliance with King Faisal is a major achievement. It could turn out to be the most significant development in Arab politics in almost a generation. After almost 20 years of intermittent animosity caused primarily by Nasser's ambitions in the Arab world and his ideological antipathy to conservative monarchies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are on the threshold of a new relationship. Faisal has been a bulwark of support during the present crisis: for the first time he has used his enormous oil leverage for political, not only economic, ends. By opting for reconciliation with Faisal, Sadat has done more than estrange Qaddafi; he has discarded Nasserism, with its thrust toward regional hegemony for Egypt and the polarization of the Arab world along "progressive" versus "reactionary" lines, and he has chosen instead to improve relations with the conservative Arab monarchies and to use diplomacy to harness their oil

power to Egypt's needs and a showdown with Israel.

Third, Sadat has put Israel on the defensive. His troops showed the vulnerability of Israel, and his diplomacy persuaded many former friends of Israel to adopt a pro-Arab stand. In this, Sadat was successful not only in black Africa, but in West Europe as well. With Israel more dependent than ever on the United States, Sadat no doubt anticipates that she will withdraw from occupied Arab territories under American pressure.

Fourth, Sadat has emerged from the war with enhanced political prestige. At home, he has earned status and support as a leader in his own right, though the elation of the moment could turn sour if the present situation freezes into a new status quo. Abroad, there is new respect for Sadat's shrewdness, and his skill, thus far, in getting the Arabs to coordinate their policies.

Fifth, for all her efforts to widen the base of foreign patrons, Egypt remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union: all her weapons are Soviet; more important, the Soviet Union is Egypt's protector, her ultimate shield from defeat. By the end of the second week of the recent war, Egypt had exhausted her military momentum and her forces were in danger again of being severely defeated by Israel. Moscow's threat of direct intervention, by transforming the regional conflict into a superpower confrontation, aided Egypt at a crucial moment.

However, the Soviet Union is also dependent on its relationship with Egypt to reassure doubting Arabs of Moscow's fealty and value, and to help retain a major Soviet presence in the Arab world. Thus, notwithstanding Sadat's preemptory ouster of 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet military personnel in July, 1972, and the tensions that marred the Cairo-Moscow relationship afterward,² the U.S.S.R. continued to supply Egypt with modern, sophisticated weaponry, in massive quantities, as was made clear in the fourth Arab-Israeli war. Now that Egypt has a wealthy and willing banker in Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union demands hard cash for its arms; but Moscow is unlikely to cut the supply under any circumstances for political and strategic, as well as economic, reasons of its own. All evidence suggests that Egypt will continue to be amply supplied by the Soviet Union.

The political landscape of the Middle East is very different today from what it was on October 6, 1973. However, the convulsions may not be over; we have yet to see the shape of the new terrain. Much depends on what the superpowers do and how well the Arabs stick together. But most important are the aims and realism of the man who has emerged stronger from the recent upheaval, namely, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. His policies will be of crucial importance in the difficult and protracted negotiations that lie ahead.

¹ *The New York Times*, November 9, 1973.

² See George Lenczowski, "Egypt and the Soviet Exodus," and Oles M. Smolansky, "The Soviet Setback in the Middle East," *Current History*, vol. 64, no. 377 (January, 1973), pp. 13-16, 35, 40; 17-20, respectively.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of December, 1973, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Dec. 14—At the beginning of a 2-day meeting in Copenhagen of heads of governments and foreign ministers, the 9 Common Market countries issue a policy statement on "European identity"; they note their "close ties" with the U.S. while affirming their independence.

The foreign ministers of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan and the United Arab Emirates arrive unexpectedly at the E.E.C. meeting. They ask for Europe's influence in pressuring for a Middle East settlement favorable to the Arabs as a condition for ending the Arab oil embargo. The Common Market foreign ministers agree to meet with the Arab ministers and to brief the Israeli ambassador in Copenhagen on their meeting.

Dec. 15—In a statement delivered by Danish Foreign Minister K. B. Andersen, the Common Market promises a "dialogue" with the Arabs on a Middle East settlement but warns of the harmful effects of the oil embargo.

International Monetary Crisis

Dec. 4—In the major bullion centers, the price of gold rises \$6 an ounce to \$106, as the Dutch guilder declines sharply because of the fuel crisis.

Dec. 10—The British pound trades at an all-time low level of \$2.3133 in foreign exchange markets. Since November, 1973, the value of the pound has dropped 12 cents.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Intl. E.E.C., Intl Monetary Crisis, U.N.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 1—*The New York Times* reports that in separate meetings with the Soviet and U.S. ambassadors last night in Cairo, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy of Egypt has called upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union to press Israel to withdraw to the cease-fire lines of October 22, 1973.

Major General Azzedin Mokhtar of Egypt says that Israel violated the truce 86 times since the cease-fire agreement was signed on November 11, 1973.

Dec. 3—Israeli and Syrian forces clash on the Golan Heights in a second day of fighting.

Dec. 7—*The New York Times* reports that Egypt plans to attend the Middle East peace conference in Geneva even in the absence of prior Israeli troop withdrawal from the Suez Canal area.

Dec. 8—Representing 9 Arab countries in talks with U.S. officials, in Washington, D.C., the Arab oil minister of Saudi Arabia, Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, and the Algerian oil minister, Belaid Abdesalam, say they expect the oil embargo on petroleum shipments to the U.S. and the Netherlands to end sometime in 1974.

Dec. 9—In a document sent to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Israel charges that at least 42 Israeli prisoners in Syria were murdered by Syrian, Moroccan and Iraqi soldiers.

Nine Arab oil ministers meeting in Kuwait order a new oil cutback of 750,000 barrels a day to begin January 1, 1974; in a statement, they promise a return to September levels when Israeli forces begin withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 Middle East war.

Dec. 10—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan tells the Israeli Parliament that Israel will not enter into peace talks with Syria until she receives information on an estimated 102 of her soldiers missing in Syria.

The Foreign Minister of Syria, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and a state minister from Abu Dhabi, Adman al-Pachachi, conclude 2 days of talks with Japanese leaders in Tokyo, reportedly to bring pressure on oil-dependent Japan to support Arab policy.

Dec. 11—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat confers with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Cairo on strategy for the forthcoming peace conference in Geneva.

Dec. 12—At a private meeting of the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agree that Secretary General Waldheim should preside over the Middle East peace conference in Geneva.

Dec. 13—In a change from a neutral to a pro-Arab position, Japan appeals to Israel to withdraw to the lines of the October 22 cease-fire resolution as a first step to total withdrawal from Israeli-occupied Arab territory; Japanese Deputy Premier Takeo Miki is presently touring Arab capitals to strengthen ties.

After apparently reaching an accord toward restoring diplomatic ties with President Houari

Boumedienne during a stopover in Algiers, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger arrives in Cairo for talks with President Sadat.

Dec. 14—Urging an end to the oil embargo against the U.S., Secretary of State Kissinger, in Riyadh, confers with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the Middle East crisis.

Speaking at a news conference in Cairo, President Sadat says Egyptian delegates will "gather in the same room" with the Israelis in Geneva, but rules out "direct negotiations."

Dec. 15—In a first visit by a U.S. Secretary of State to Syria since 1953, Kissinger holds talks with President Assad to clear away possible obstacles to the Geneva peace conference, originally expected to begin December 18 but now reportedly delayed a day or so.

Dec. 17—Kissinger meets in Jerusalem with Israeli Premier Golda Meir and other Israeli leaders, to reassure them and make sure the Geneva peace talks open on December 21.

Before leaving Jerusalem, Kissinger declares that the talks with Israeli leaders have led to "complete agreement about the procedures and the terms of reference of the opening of the conference" in Geneva on a Middle East peace. Israeli officials say that they will participate in the peace talks following Kissinger's assurance of U.S. support for Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban reiterates his government's refusal to confer with Syria until Syria produces a list of Israeli prisoners of war; however, this does not preclude meeting with Egypt and Jordan.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy flies to Syria, reportedly to urge Syria to attend the Geneva peace conference.

Dec. 18—In Rome, Arab guerrillas attack an American jetliner; they hurl hand grenades at the plane and spray it with submachine-gun fire. Some 29 persons on board and 2 outside the plane are killed. The guerrillas hijack a West German airliner and fly to Athens; it is reported that after arriving in Athens, they began to shoot and kill hostages aboard the West German plane to back up their demands for the release of 2 Palestinian terrorists held in Greece.

Coming from Athens, the Arab terrorists land in Kuwait; they release their hostages in exchange for "free passage" to an unknown destination. Dispelling rumors of multiple killings, a stewardess aboard the hijacked plane declares that only 1 person was killed on the plane, an Italian hostage whose body was dumped on the Athens airport runway.

The Syrian government announces that it will not attend the Middle East peace conference.

Dec. 21—In Geneva, the first Arab-Israeli peace con-

ference opens. U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger and U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko urge that a permanent peace settlement be worked out to avoid another Middle East war. The participants include Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the U.N. Syria is boycotting the meeting. The Egyptian and Jordanian delegates address the conference and declare that Israel must return to the pre-1967 borders. Foreign Minister Abba Eban issues a statement indicating that Israel cannot return to the pre-1967 frontiers.

Dec. 22—The Middle East peace conference ends its first round in Geneva with an agreement to begin talks on separating Israeli and Egyptian forces along the east and west banks of the Suez Canal. A communiqué states that a military working group will negotiate the disentangling of troops. Kissinger departs for the U.S.

The New York Times reports that the Kuwaiti government has declared that it is "favorably considering" the request by Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, for custody of 5 Palestinian hijackers; Arafat wants them to stand trial before the P.L.O.

Dec. 23—Following a 2-day meeting in Teheran of ministers from the 6 Persian Gulf states (which provide about 43 percent of petroleum used by non-Communist nations), an announcement is issued that the posted price of crude oil has been increased to \$11.65 a barrel effective January 1, 1974; the current price is \$5.11 a barrel. Under the posted price, considered a legal fiction by experts, the Persian Gulf states will receive, in tax and royalty payments, \$7.00 a barrel.

The Damascus radio issues a broadcast criticizing the Geneva talks on the Middle East. The broadcast asserts that the only settlement acceptable to Syria must provide for complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

A Kuwaiti minister declares that the 5 hijackers will be turned over to the P.L.O.

Dec. 24—The Kuwaiti Minister of Oil, Abdul Rahman Atiki, addresses a meeting of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in Kuwait.

Dec. 25—The Saudi Arabian oil minister, Sheik Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, announces, on behalf of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, a decision made by Arab oil ministers at the end of their 2-day meeting in Kuwait: oil production will be increased by 10 percent and a 5 percent reduction in oil production scheduled for January, 1974, has been cancelled. Japan and West Europe primarily will benefit from the increased flow of oil. The total embargo on oil exports to the U.S. and the Netherlands remains in effect.

Dec. 26—In Geneva, Egyptian and Israeli military generals confer on separating their forces along the Suez Canal; the meeting is chaired by Lieutenant General Ensio Siilasvuo of Finland, commander of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East.

Dec. 30—A U.N. spokesman reports that 2 days ago there were 46 shooting incidents along the Israeli-Egyptian front.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Dec. 1—The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee discloses that the NATO nations have agreed that any large-scale use of nuclear weapons within Europe should be accompanied by U.S. strikes from outside Europe.

Dec. 6—In Brussels for the NATO ministerial conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger tells reporters that European military independence is at least 10 years away.

Dec. 7—The NATO allies assure the U.S. of their efforts to reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments burden created by maintaining U.S. troops in Europe. The passage of the Jackson-Nunn amendment last month by the U.S. Congress provides for proportionate U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe if balance-of-payments losses are not made up by the NATO allies by mid-1975.

Dec. 9—In Brussels, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger confers with NATO leaders to ease U.S.-European relations.

Dec. 10—At the opening of the winter meeting of foreign ministers of the NATO member states, Kissinger and French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert clash on whether improved U.S.-Soviet relations will adversely affect the security of West Europe.

Dec. 11—In statements issued at the close of the NATO meeting, Kissinger and the European foreign ministers acknowledge that the 2-day talks have helped improve relations.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Dec. 5—The General Assembly votes, 53 to 50, to defer until next year a joint proposal by China, Algeria and 31 others to fill Cambodia's seat in the U.N. (now held by the government) with the exile government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the deposed Cambodian leader.

Dec. 11—The Security Council votes unanimously to end private efforts made by Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to urge South Africa to give independence to South-West Africa.

The General Assembly approves the financing arrangements for the U.N. Emergency Force in the

Middle East at a cost of \$30 million for the first 6 months.

Dec. 17—The U.N. General Assembly votes to recess its 28th session, rather than adjourn.

War in Indochina

Dec. 5—In the first frontal assault by Communists on a South Vietnamese district capital since the January, 1973, cease-fire, North Vietnamese tanks attack Kien Duc, 120 miles from Saigon.

About 20 insurgent commandos stage a rocket attack in Phnom Penh, the first within the Cambodian capital in more than a year.

Dec. 8—Communist soldiers attack Kompong Speu, 29 miles from Phnom Penh. Thousands flee.

Dec. 9—Fighting continues in the South Vietnamese district capital of Kien Duc, reportedly recaptured by government troops 2 days ago.

Dec. 12—In heavy fighting Cambodian troops try to reopen Route 5, which was cut by Communist forces yesterday.

Dec. 15—An unarmed U.S. search team, made up mostly of Green Berets, is attacked in South Vietnam by Communist forces; an American and a Vietnamese are killed and 7 others are wounded.

Dec. 16—The U.S. government, for the first time since the signing of the January, 1973, cease-fire, protests to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, because of the attack yesterday on unarmed American soldiers, part of the joint military team, while they were searching the wreckage of a helicopter.

Dec. 20—U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the North Vietnamese chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, meet for 4½ hours in Paris where they complain about the cease-fire violations.

Dec. 21—In Paris, the Vietcong delegates walk out of a negotiating session with South Vietnamese delegates; the delegates were to discuss the political future of South Vietnam.

Dec. 26—Clashes between Cambodian troops and insurgent forces erupt at several places in Cambodia.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 21—Argentine President Juan D. Perón, in a nationwide radio and television broadcast, announces a 3-year economic plan to increase the gross national product by 7.8 percent a year.

AUSTRALIA

Dec. 8—In a national referendum, Australian voters reject Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's proposal for government control of prices and income.

AUSTRIA

Dec. 10—The government closes its transit center

at Schönau Castle, which handled some 80,000 Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union; the Red Cross center at Wöllersdorf will handle the emigrants henceforth.

BANGLADESH

Dec. 24—President Abu Sayed Choudhury resigns.

BULGARIA

(See *German Federal Republic*)

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Dec. 26—President Lon Nol names Foreign Minister Long Boret as Premier.

CHILE

Dec. 4—The Chilean government orders the Swedish Ambassador Harold Edelstam to leave the country; he provided asylum for political refugees.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See *German Federal Republic; India*)

DENMARK

Dec. 5—Following parliamentary elections yesterday in which both the government and the main opposition parties suffered substantial setbacks, Premier Anker Jorgensen submits his government's resignation to Queen Margrethe II.

Dec. 17—Queen Margrethe II asks Poul Hartling, a former foreign minister, to form a minority government.

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, NATO*)

Dec. 5—On the eve of a 24-hour general strike Premier Pierre Messmer and Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announce new anti-inflationary measures.

Dec. 8—In Paris, Finance Ministers d'Estaing and Chau Kim Nhan of South Vietnam sign a \$25-million economic aid agreement for reconstruction of Vietnam. According to French officials, similar aid is to go to North Vietnam.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Dec. 11—In Prague, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Premier Lubomir Strougal of Czechoslovakia sign a treaty formalizing relations; it voids the Munich pact of 35 years ago.

Dec. 12—In Sofia, West German and Bulgarian representatives sign preliminary documents establishing diplomatic ties.

Dec. 14—Foreign Minister Walter Scheel tells his

party, the Free Democrats, that he will resign to run for President in the May, 1974, election.

GREECE

Dec. 1—The government orders the reopening of all universities on December 3.

Dec. 4—The U.S. renews full diplomatic contacts with the new, army-backed government, which took power on November 25 in a bloodless coup.

Dec. 14—The government frees some of the several hundred political prisoners held since last month's student riots, and promises to release all by December 16.

Dec. 31—President Phaidon Gizikis, in a nationwide broadcast, declares that a new constitution will be promulgated.

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 5—Following 3 days of talks between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Czechoslovak Communist party leader Gustav Husak in New Delhi, India and Czechoslovakia sign an accord to increase trade and long-term economic cooperation.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Dec. 5—The leadership of the governing Labor party adopts a revised election platform, authorizing the government to enter the Geneva peace negotiations.

Dec. 6—After accepting full responsibility for Israel's setbacks at the start of the October, 1973, war, Premier Golda Meir wins a vote of confidence, 291 to 33, from the Central Committee of her Labor party.

Dec. 31—Elections are held for a new Parliament and for 140 town and city councils.

JAPAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Dec. 18—After meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Cairo, Deputy Premier Takeo Miki of Japan declares that Japan will lend \$140 million to Egypt to widen and deepen the Suez Canal.

Dec. 21—To halt inflation, the official discount rate, set by the Bank of Japan, is raised from 7 to 9 percent (the fifth increase this year).

The Japanese Parliament approves 2 emergency bills, giving the government power to fix prices and to regulate the production and supply of oil as well as a variety of other daily necessities.

Dec. 22—The Japanese Cabinet approves an "austerity" budget for 1974 to curb inflation. Premier Kakuei Tanaka declares a "state of emergency."

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Dec. 1—South Korean Defense Minister Yu Jae Hung

announces that the armed forces have been placed on alert because North Korea has claimed territorial rights to waters around 5 Yellow Sea Islands held by South Korea.

Dec. 4—Following yesterday's Cabinet reshuffle Premier Kim Jong Pil promises "administrative reforms."

Dec. 5—Negotiators from South Korea and North Korea meet at Panmunjom to discuss the resumption of political talks suspended in August, 1973.

Dec. 7—President Park Chung Hee orders the release of all students arrested in recent anti-government demonstrations and reinstatement of those expelled from their schools.

LEBANON

Dec. 20—In downtown Beirut, a bomb explodes and wounds 3 persons; anti-government riots are staged in Lebanon's main cities.

RUMANIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Dec. 27—It is reported that, during the past 3 days, tribal fighting in Natal Province and the Transkei District has left 24 persons dead and 37 wounded.

SPAIN

Dec. 20—Premier Luis Carrero Blanco, responsible for governing Spain in the name of aging Generalissimo Francisco Franco, is assassinated in Madrid.

Dec. 22—The Spanish security police announce that they have evidence that Basque nationalists assassinated the Premier.

Dec. 28—4 hooded men hold a news conference near Bordeaux, France. They declare that they belong to E.T.A., a Basque nationalist group, and that they alone are responsible for the Premier's assassination.

Dec. 29—Franco names Interior Minister Carlos Arias Navarro as Premier.

SWEDEN

(See also *Chile*)

Dec. 5—The government announces that it will not replace Harold Edelstam, Ambassador to Chile.

SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

THAILAND

Dec. 20—Results of balloting yesterday for a new National Assembly by a 2,300-man convention indicate that urban candidates have received a large proportion of the vote.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; U.K., Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy, Government*)

Dec. 12—Addressing the Supreme Soviet (Parliament), Deputy Premier Nikolai K. Baibakov discusses an economic plan for 1974 that promises increased growth in the consumer sector and a slight cut in the military budget. Yesterday the Communist party's Central Committee secretly approved the economic reports.

Dec. 14—Concluding its semi-annual session, the Supreme Soviet formally approves both the new budget and the 1974 economic plan worked out by the Central Committee of the Communist party.

Dec. 26—*Soyuz 13* successfully completes its 8-day mission and lands in a desert region in the Kazakhstan Republic.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Intl, Intl Monetary Crisis; U.K., Northern Ireland*)

Dec. 4—After 2 days of talks in Moscow with Soviet leaders, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, reports Britain's acceptance of a long-standing invitation to Prime Minister Edward Heath to visit the Soviet Union, probably next summer.

Dec. 5—As part of a strict new program to deal with the energy crisis, Britain imposes a compulsory speed limit of 50 miles per hour.

Dec. 6—The Treasury reports Britain's biggest quarterly trade deficit in history—\$760.8 million.

Dec. 12—Responding to a crippling rail slowdown by 29,000 engineers and firemen, the government extends the national state of emergency for a second month.

Dec. 13—Prime Minister Heath announces that, as of January 1, the British work week will be cut to 3 days and details other measures to cope with widespread loss of energy supplies. Heath places primary responsibility for the crisis on the work slowdown by the coal miners, electrical engineers and railroad engineers; the slowdown has diminished the supply of coal for power generators.

Dec. 17—The British government announces the largest budget reduction—\$2.76 billion—in British history; the budget cut has been made because of widespread labor disruptions, the energy shortage and a growing trade deficit. Restrictions on consumer credit are imposed.

Northern Ireland

Dec. 5—In opening talks in London, leaders of the new coalition executive body for Northern Ireland and the Prime Ministers of Britain and the Irish Republic agree immediately on the basic structure for a Council of Ireland.

Dec. 9—After 50 hours of talks, Britain, the Irish Republic and the moderate Protestant and Roman

Catholic leadership of Northern Ireland agree on far-reaching proposals for the future of Ulster, clearing the way for a Protestant-Catholic coalition to take office in the North for the first time.

Dec. 31—The 15-man coalition executive composed of 6 Roman Catholics and 9 Protestants is sworn in. At a private ceremony, the British Secretary of State for Ulster, Francis Pym, hands over certain powers to the new executive body, headed by Brian Faulkner, a former Prime Minister.

UNITED STATES

Economy

Dec. 5—The Cost of Living Council grants a price increase of 2 cents a gallon on heating oil; the Council announces that refineries will be required to cut gasoline prices by 1 cent a gallon.

Dec. 7—The Labor Department reports a return in November, 1973, to the nation's unemployment rate of 4.7 percent, the predominant level since last spring, despite a dip in October to 4.5 percent.

In a second increase this month, several major banks raise their prime rate to 10 percent. The Federal Reserve Board reduces its marginal reserve requirements on large denomination certificates of deposit from 11 to 8 percent, a step apparently aimed at expanding credit.

Dec. 10—In exchange for promises by the American Motors, Ford and General Motors companies to limit 1974 price increases, the Cost of Living Council abolishes price and wage controls over the auto industry.

Dec. 12—The Cost of Living Council rules that 5 aerospace companies owe 108,000 workers back pay of \$28 million-\$30 million withheld by the now-defunct Pay Board.

Dec. 19—The Commerce Department reports that in the third quarter of 1973, the U.S. balance of payments showed a surplus of \$2.5 billion.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, E.E.C., Middle East, NATO, War in Indochina; Greece*)

Dec. 5—In a joint statement and supplementary declaration, President Richard Nixon and visiting President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania pledge "continued development of friendly relations" and economic, industrial and technical cooperation.

Dec. 6—President Nixon announces the appointments of 3 ambassadors and 6 high State Department officials, all career foreign service officers. The ambassadors nominated are: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to the Soviet Union (succeeding Jacob D. Beam); David D. Newsom to Indonesia; and David H. Popper to Chile. President Nixon nominates Robert J. McCloskey as Ambassador-at-Large.

Dec. 8—Secretary of State Kissinger begins a 2-week trip to Europe and the Middle East.

Dec. 13—In New Delhi, U.S. and Indian negotiators initial an accord on the disposal of American-owned Indian currency in New Delhi. Formal signing is expected in March, 1974.

Dec. 14—President Nixon appoints Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker to head the U.S. delegation at the forthcoming Middle East peace talks in Geneva.

Government

Dec. 3—After a 6-day effort fails (blocked by a filibuster), the Senate, in a 48-to-36 vote, defers action on the measure to finance federal election campaigns with public funds; Senate leaders promise to revive it early next year. Freed of the campaign financing provisions, the bill to extend the debt limit to \$475.7 billion, which passed the House last week, is passed by the Senate and is sent to the President for his signature.

In a letter to Speaker of the House Carl Albert (D., Okla.), President Nixon asks the House of Representatives to proceed with the previously delayed foreign trade bill, despite the risk of Congress' adding anti-Soviet amendments.

Dec. 4—To replace John A. Love who resigned yesterday as energy policy adviser and as an assistant to the President, President Nixon appoints William E. Simon as chief of the Federal Energy Office. Simon will also continue in his job as Under Secretary of the Treasury.

In U.S. District Court the 7th corporation to plead guilty to an illegal contribution to President Nixon's reelection campaign, Phillips Petroleum Company, receives the maximum fine of \$5,000; William W. Keeler, chairman of P.P.C., is fined \$1,000.

Dec. 5—By a vote of 44 to 41, the Senate narrowly approves a \$2.39-billion compromise foreign aid bill which now goes to the President for his signature.

Dec. 6—After being sworn in as the 40th Vice President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford pledges "equal justice for all Americans." Just one hour earlier, the nomination of the former House minority leader was confirmed by a vote of 387 to 35 in the House; the Senate voted, 92 to 3, for confirmation on November 27.

Voting 85 to 3, the Senate passes and sends to the President a \$32.9-billion bill to fund federal health, education, labor and welfare programs; yesterday, the House of Representatives voted, 371 to 33, to approve the measure.

Dec. 7—Republicans in the House of Representatives choose Representative John J. Rhodes of Arizona as minority leader to succeed Gerald R. Ford.

In U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-

bia, President Nixon's former appointments secretary, Dwight L. Chapin, pleads not guilty to charges of perjury before the grand jury investigating the Watergate case.

A Bahamian court denies a U.S. request for the extradition of financier Robert L. Vesco to face fraud and conspiracy charges in the U.S.

Dec. 8—In an unprecedented disclosure, President Richard Nixon makes public his personal financial file, including his income tax returns for his first four years in office, which totaled \$78,651 on a total adjusted gross income of \$1,122,264. The President announces that he will abide by the decision of the Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation on whether he owes an additional \$267,000 in federal income taxes. Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.), chairman of the Joint Committee, confirms that he has agreed to the President's request for a tax review by his committee. The matters for the committee to study refer to a land sale in San Clemente, California, and President Nixon's tax deduction for the gift of his papers to the National Archives.

Today's financial information also discloses the establishment of a \$25,000 trust fund for President Nixon's daughter Patricia in 1958 (when he was Vice President) by Elmer B. Bobst, then chairman of the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company.

Dec. 12—At a 2-hour meeting, members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation agree to review completely President Nixon's tax returns, not just the two items raised by the President.

Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski reveals that the White House has agreed to let his investigators examine its files.

Dec. 13—The House of Representatives votes to ban the use of fuel to transport children beyond neighborhood schools in an amendment to an emergency energy bill exempting the coal industry from a provision restricting "windfall profits" for fuel suppliers.

At a White House energy briefing, President Nixon expresses the hope that gasoline rationing may be unnecessary; and William E. Simon outlines new electric lighting and fuel measures to reduce the use of energy.

The Senate approves 89 to 2 a \$73.7-billion defense appropriations bill, reducing aid to South Vietnam, but retaining the Defense Department's weapons program.

Dec. 15—President Nixon signs the year-round daylight-saving time legislation, passed by Congress yesterday; it takes effect at 2:00 A.M., on January 6, 1974, for a 2-year period. Year-round daylight-saving time, last in effect in World War II, has been instituted to help conserve energy.

Dec. 17—In a statement, President Nixon declares that he will neither sign nor veto a measure giving the U.S. District Court original jurisdiction over any civil action brought by the Select Senate Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities to force the President to hand over Watergate material. The measure will become law at midnight without his signature. The District Court had said previously it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the Senate Watergate committee's subpoenas of Watergate materials.

The Senate votes, 75-10, to confirm the appointment of Senator William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio) as Attorney General; he replaces Elliot L. Richardson.

Dec. 18—The Senate Watergate committee unanimously votes to subpoena over 200 White House tapes and documents relating to the Watergate scandal and to campaign financing.

Dec. 19—Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D., N.C.), announces that he will not run for reelection in 1974; he is retiring because of his age.

President Nixon releases \$1.1 billion in impounded funds for education.

After having listened to the presidential tapes in his chambers, Judge John H. Sirica rules that nearly all of 2 Watergate tapes and part of a third tape are covered by executive privilege; they contain nothing relating to the Watergate case.

The White House press office declares that it has accepted subpoenas from the Senate Watergate committee for nearly 500 presidential tape recordings and other documents.

The Cost of Living Council authorizes an immediate price increase of \$1 a barrel for crude oil. It is expected that oil and gasoline prices will soon reflect this increase. At a White House news briefing, President Nixon proposes that Congress enact an "excess profits" tax on oil companies.

Melvin R. Laird announces his resignation as chief domestic adviser to President Nixon.

Dec. 20—At a news conference, the chief of the Federal Energy Office, William E. Simon, asks motorists to limit themselves to a maximum of 10 gallons of gasoline a week; he also asks filling stations to limit gasoline purchases to 10 gallons per customer.

The House and Senate each approve a \$73.7-billion defense appropriations measure.

The Senate approves and sends to the President a bill authorizing \$2.2 billion in emergency military aid for Israel, and a bill providing \$5.78 billion in foreign aid appropriations. The House and Senate pass and send to President Nixon a compromise manpower bill for consolidating job-training programs.

Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D., N.J.), announces that John M. Doar has been asked to

serve as special counsel to the House Judiciary Committee investigating the possible impeachment of President Nixon.

Dec. 21—The Senate and House complete action on a bill for an 11 percent, 2-step increase in Social Security benefits for some 29 million retired persons.

The Senate approves and sends to President Nixon a \$1.7-billion catch-all appropriations bill, and a bill to reorganize bankrupt railroad lines east of the Mississippi and place them under a new government railway corporation.

Dec. 22—The 93d Congress adjourns its first session without acting on an energy crisis bill empowering the President to impose gasoline rationing without congressional approval.

Dec. 27—Howard R. Hughes, the reclusive billionaire, 2 of his top aides and 2 other business associates are named in a 9-point criminal indictment by a federal grand jury in Nevada. Hughes is in the Bahamas.

William E. Simon announces that a "stand-by gasoline rationing system" has been prepared; however, he expresses a personal, optimistic view that rationing can be avoided if the "public continues to cooperate."

Dec. 28—President Nixon signs into law the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, consolidating manpower and training programs. The bill allows state and local governments a larger role in determining their need for such programs.

Dec. 29—President Nixon signs the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, authorizing \$375 million during the next 5 years to help set up and evaluate H.M.O. plans throughout the country. H.M.O. subscribers will pay a flat monthly or yearly fee that will entitle them to basic health care services.

Dec. 30—Three announcements are issued in the name of the Federal Energy Office director, William E. Simon, to demonstrate that the fuel allocation programs will be enforced. One enforcement action called for is an investigation into the possible stockpiling of fuel "in excessive and unreasonable amounts."

Dec. 31—Federal Energy Office director William E. Simon authorizes distributors of gasoline, heating oil and diesel fuel to raise prices to cover their increased costs; wholesalers will be able to raise their price by one-half cent a gallon and retailers, by 1 cent a gallon.

President Nixon signs 19 pieces of legislation, including a bill to establish a federal flood insurance program.

Labor and Industry

Dec. 4—Truck drivers block highways in 5 states to protest higher fuel prices and lower speed limits.

Dec. 14—In a 2d day of wildcat truck blockades, thousands of independent truck drivers again protest higher fuel prices and lower speed limits.

Dec. 18—Frank E. Fitzsimmons, president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, announces that he will ask trucking industry employers to reopen their national master freight agreement to give wage increases to over-the-road truckers, whose wages have been eroded by the fuel shortage.

Dec. 28—The General Motors Corporation announces that it will lay off some 86,000 workers because of the drop in sales of standard-size cars resulting from the energy crisis.

Politics

Dec. 18—Lieutenant Governor Malcolm Wilson of N.Y. is sworn in as governor, shortly after Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller signs his resignation statement after serving for 15 years.

Science and Space

Dec. 25—Two of the Skylab 3 astronauts take a record 7-hour space "walk."

Supreme Court

Dec. 11—In a 6-3 vote, the court rules that persons taken into custody on minor charges in a valid arrest may then be searched for evidence of more serious but unrelated crimes without a warrant. Specifically, the Supreme Court upholds the convictions of 2 men who had separately been arrested for motor vehicle infractions; they had been frisked and then charged with possession of narcotics.

VENEZUELA

Dec. 12—Following the election on December 10, Carlos Andrés Pérez, candidate of the Democratic Action party, is declared President-elect.

Dec. 13—According to the latest returns, the Democratic Action party has taken a commanding lead in the election for Congress on December 10, polling 44.38 percent of the vote.


Dec. 28—In Caracas, the Mines and Hydrocarbons Ministry announces that beginning January 1, Venezuelan crude oil will sell at the posted price of \$14.08 a barrel; the previous price was \$7.74 a barrel. The Venezuelan government will now net about \$8.80 a barrel.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See *Intl. War in Indochina; France*)

ZAMBIA

Dec. 6—Running unopposed, President Kenneth D. Kaunda is reelected to a third term, but 4 of his ministers are defeated in the first general elections since Zambia became a one-party state.



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